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RISK ANALYSIS IN GEOTECHNICAL AND EARTHQUAKE ENGINEERING 
STATE-OF-THE-ART AND PRACTICE FOR EMBANKMENT DAMS 
D.N.D. Hartford 
British Columbia Hydro 
Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada 
ABSTRACT 
Despite a proliferation of papers on quantitative risk analysis for dams during the past twenty years, risk analysis has not 
found widespread application in dam safety practice. Recent experience suggests that, despite a great deal of enthusiasm in 
the 1990’s, the professional opinion concerning the usefulness of risk analysis in dam safety practice is almost as divided now 
as it was in the early 1980’s. This paper presents an account of the history and development of risk analysis ln dam safety 
practice in the field of geotechnical earthquake engineering since its inception in the early 1960’s to September 2000. 
Against this background, and with regard to the discussion of the State-of-the-Art/Practice, the paper describes the latest 
attempts to quantify risk associated with earth dams for two failure modes, seismically induced liquefaction and a proposed 
procedure for seismically induced non-liquefaction deformation failure. To overcome the difficulties in reporting a complete 
risk analysis, the case study in Part II is presented in a way that will enable the profession to obtain an initial appreciation of 
what is involved in quantified risk analysis for dams. Concerning the State-of-the-Art/Practice, the paper presents 
background to what are essentially proposed practices as there is as yet no broadly accepted standard of practice for 
defensible analysis of risk associated with large dams. 
PART I -EVOLUTION OF QUANTITATIVE RISK 
ANALYSIS IN DAM SAFETY PRACTICE 
INTRODUCTION 
The term “risk” implies some form of action in the face of 
uncertainty; it is a term of universal significance with several 
interpretations. Risk assessment provides a basis for making 
decisions concerning the need for, and extent of, risk control 
measures. Risk analysis is an integral part of the risk 
assessment process. 
Recent improvements in understanding of what dam risk 
assessment involves have revealed that the decision-making 
process concerning the risk issue in question governs the form 
and extent of the risk analysis method adopted. Therefore, any 
discussion on the use of risk analysis to support dam safety 
decisions and management must be carried out within the 
context of the decision-making and management processes 
that apply. These processes will generally be different from 
one application to the next, 6om one owner to the next and 
from one jurisdiction to the next, with the result that there is 
no universal and concise approach to risk assessment. 
This said, the methods used to analyse risk should follow the 
same general engineering and scientific principles in all 
jurisdictions recognising that the extent to which these 
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principles are applied will be dependent on the risk assessment 
processes that are adopted. 
The discussion is set against a background where, despite a 
burgeoning, but usually not independently peer-reviewed 
literature on risk assessment in dam safety practice, dam safety 
regulators have remained generally silent. This poses a 
significant obstacle to informed debate on risk analysis 
because “technically well-informed” regulators are essential 
participants in any debate concerning the role of risk analysis 
in dam safety decision-making. The regulatory authorities 
must ultimately be satisfied that the analysis methods are 
appropriate for use in decision-making concerning matters of 
public safety. The absence of stated regulatory positions 
concerning the acceptability of risk analysis methods in dam 
safety decision-making practice means that much of the debate 
surrounding its potential uses are carried out in somewhat of 
an intellectual vacuum and without societal consent which is 
often represented by regulation. 
This paper reflects the view that prior to discussion on 
applications of risk analysis in dam safety practice, the dam 
engineering profession should first develop an agreed 
understanding of: 
1. What risk is and in particular what dam risk is? 
2. How risks posed by dams can be analysed? 
3. What are the experience and qualification requirements 
for participants in the risk analysis process? 
4. What are the strengths and weaknesses of proposed 
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approaches? 
5. What do the outputs of a risk analysis for a dam mean? 
6. How can methods and results of risk analyses be 
validated? 
7. How can the results of a risk analysis be used in dam 
safety decision-making? 
8. What are the roles and responsibilities of all participants 
in the overall process? 
Addressing these issues does not impose conditions on risk 
analysis that are any different than those imposed on other 
methods of analysis used for important decision making 
concerning matters of public safety. 
In its most complete sense, risk analysis characterises the 
uncertainty that is inherent in the answer to the question How 
safe is the dam? Risk analysis does have other uses but these 
are necessarily less than complete to the extent that different 
forms of risk analysis can be applied to varying degrees across 
an entire spectrum that ranges from an initial subjective sense 
of the risk to a complete characterisation of the risk. 
Therefore, it is important that the risk analysis identifies 
precisely where it lies in this very broad spectrum. Further, it 
is important to make a distinction between formal risk 
assessment used to develop safety cases and safety reports for 
licensing purposes, and informal risk assessments. The latter 
have varying degrees of usefulness ranging from an initial 
perception of what might be an appropriate course of action, to 
detailed charactetisation of the risk to justify further risk 
control measures. However, they fall short of being suitable to 
reach a conclusion that the risks are being adequately 
controlled. To date, all dam risk assessments have, by default, 
been of the informal type as there are no regulatory structures 
to complete the societal and licensing component of the 
assessment anywhere in the world to my knowledge. Risk 
analyses, especially quantitative risk analyses, which result in 
actions to reduce dam risk may be quite different to those 
required to reach agreement with a regulator that a dam is safe 
enough. A risk analysis conducted to achieve the former 
purpose may not be adequate for the latter. In general, a risk 
analysis that is deemed appropriate for one application may be 
deemed to be unsuitable for another application. 
It is also important to recognise that risk analysis is not a 
decision-making process in itself, but rather an integral part of 
a risk assessment. Risk analysis and risk assessment add new 
dimensions to dam safety decision-making as they involve, 
amongst other things, explicit characterisation of the 
uncertainty that pervades all aspects of dam safety decision- 
making as well as the complex concept of societal risk. 
Societal risk is regulated by society as a whole through its 
political processes and regulatory mechanisms. Typically, 
societal risks are unevenly distributed, as are their attendant 
benefits. The distribution of such major costs and benefits is a 
classic function of Government, subject to public discussion 
and debate (Health and Safety Executive (HSE), 1999). 
Therefore, the notion of the dam engineering profession and/or 
individual dam owners or agencies establishing so-called 
‘tolerable criteria’ for societal risk, when viewed in this 
context, becomes untenable. 
At the outset, it is important to note that, with one or two 
notable excedions including flood protection dykes in the 
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Netherlands, risk assessment aimed at determining if a dam is 
safe enough, is generally not being carried out. Further, and 
despite the proliferation of papers on the subject of risk 
analysis during the past ten years, there is no formal regulatory 
acceptance of proposed risk analysis and risk assessment 
methods. This can be attributed in part to the lack of an 
appropriate regulatory framework to address the issue of risks 
posed by dams. Therefore, opportunities to fully utilise risk 
analysis in dam safety practice are limited at this time. 
This paper discusses the role of risk analysis in dam safety 
decision-making and management from this broad perspective. 
It is based on the experiences of a regulated owner, which has 
formally embraced the concepts of risk management in dam 
safety as a matter of corporate policy. Further, it is based on 
almost ten years of experience in experimenting with the 
various proposed approaches, subjecting them to critical 
review, rejecting some and improving others, and ultimately 
subjecting the most satisfactory approach to a simulated test of 
(risk) regulatory acceptability. 
TERMINOLOGY 
Clear and consistent definition, interpretation and use of risk 
management terms are essential. In this regard, the definitions 
and interpretations presented in the Guide to Dam Risk 
Management (Dam Safety Interest Group (DSIG), 1999) and 
the draft ICOLD bulletin on Risk Assessment (International 
Commission of Large Dams (ICOLD), 2000) are an important 
step in this direction. The terminology and interpretations 
used here are consistent with these documents. A useful 
discussion on risk assessment terminology was prepared by 
the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE, 1995) which 
serves as an authoritative source. The following focuses on 
the key definitions and interpretations 
Risk: A measure of the probability and severity of an adverse 
effect to life, health, property or the environment. One 
interpretation holds that risk may be estimated by the 
mathematical expectation of the consequences of an adverse 
event occurring (i.e. the product of the probability of 
occurrence and the consequence) or, alternatively, by the 
triplet of scenario, probability of occurrence and the 
consequence. 
Risk Assessment: whose essential features are illustrated in 
Fig. I-l is central to dam risk management. In risk 
assessment, the results of the risk analysis and risk evaluation 
processes are integrated and recommendations are made 
concerning the need to reduce risk. 
Risk Analysis: Risk analysis provides an understanding of the 
nature and extent of the uncertainty concerning the conditions 
under which the dam will be required to perform and the 
uncertainty in the response of the dam to these conditions. 
Risk analysis for dam safety is a structured process aimed at 
identifying both the extent and likelihood of consequences 
associated with dam or dam component failures (uncontrolled 
release of the reservoir). Risk analysis processes, when 
applied by appropriately experienced and knowledgeable 
individuals or groups, assist in revealing uncertainty in the 
2 
._ . - . I - - -  _ - F - . - - . - - - e - - -  - . . .  ~.^ .~~ .  ~.-  - . .  .  -  . - _ .  
fundamental performance characteristics of the dam and its 
components. The process generates information about the risk 
in the system and the contributors to that risk. 
Risk analysis processes can assist in all aspects of dam safety 
management that involve the collection of data and generation 
of information and which lead to the conclusion (in the face of 
uncertainty) that, given certain performance requirements are 















Fig. I-1. Risk Assessment and its components - Risk Analysis and Risk Evaluation 
Risk analysis for dam safety requires a multidisciplinary 
approach as it covers areas of science, engineering and social 
science expertise ranging from hazard analysis, dam response 
analysis to consequence analysis involving consideration of 
economics, sociology and psychology. Therefore, when used 
as an input to the decision-making process, risk analysis may 
not be solely a matter of engineering. 
Risk evaluation involves policy analysis and policy 
development and therefore is not an engineering discipline. 
Engineers may be involved in risk evaluation to explain the 
insights that risk analysis can reveal and how it might be best 
interpreted. In this regard, engineering provides input to and 
support for the policy-making activities that constitute risk 
evaluation. 
In principle, the process must be able to identify and analyse 
all possible failure modes in the same way as forensic 
engineering identifies the causes of failures and accidents. 
Risk Evaluation: the process of understanding and judging the 
significance of risk is fundamental to risk assessment and risk- 
based decision making. The principal role of risk evaluation 
in risk assessment is the generation of decision guidance 
against which the results of a risk analysis can be assessed. 
The process of generating risk-based decision guidance 
requires a statement of the owner’s safety management 
principles, values and preferences as well as those of the 
public, including consideration of the prevailing financial, 
legal and regulatory conditions. 
Whereas regulatory authorities may provide or rule on 
tolerable risk levels, public acceptance will require good 
communication and transparency of process. It may well be 
that, as risk assessment becomes established on a firm 
scientifically valid base, risk communication could become as 
important as risk reduction in determining public tolerance of 
risks posed by dams. 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Definitive statements concerning the significance of a 
particular risk require definition of the background against 
which the significance of the risk is being described. In order 
to do this, there must be a general understanding of all risks 
within the system under consideration. In some cases the 
system will be limited to the dam itself. In others, the system 
could include local downstream, state wide, national and even 
international elements. 
The following historical perspective is not intended to be a 
complete chronological account of all stages of the evolution 
of risk analysis in dam safety practice, but rather to focus on 
the principal stages in the development of this branch of 
engineering as applied to dams. The pre-1990’s material is 
based on the literature and on discussions with some of the 
key players who were involved in the various initiatives. The 
1990’s account reflects my own first hand knowledge and 
involvement. In presenting the account of the development of 
risk analysis in dam safety in this way, I recognise that this 
‘abridged history’ cannot also provide a view of the history of 
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the development of theories and models in the field of general 
geotechnical earthquake engineering during the same period. 
Origins - The 60’s. Consideration of risk is implicit in 
engineering practice and techniques to control risks, based on 
empirical evidence, have been absorbed into engineering 
practice over the years. The first formal published treatment 
of risk estimation can be traced back to Casagrande’s Terzaghi 
lecture in 1964 (Casagrande, 1965). The significance of 
Casagrande’s work, which is rarely quoted in contemporary 
literature, should not be overlooked as it forms a cornerstone 
of contemporary applications of risk analysis in geotechnical 
engineering practice. 
Casagrande’s contribution is remarkably insightful not just in 
relation to risk analysis but also in relation to ignorance, 
uncertainty and admitting to their extent in engineering 
practice. Casagrande’s definition of ‘Calculated Risk’ goes 
beyond what nowadays would be called risk analysis (the 
process of estimating risk) to include risk assessment and risk 
control. Casagrande observed that “the term ‘calculated risk’ 
is widely used in engineering, if not somewhat loosely; and 
that usage and most suggested definitions have in common a 
meaning that includes the following two distinct steps: 
(a) The use of imper$ect knowledge, guided by judgement and 
experience, to estimate the probable ranges of all 
pertinent quantities that enter into the solution of a 
problem. 
(b) The decision on an appropriate margin of safety, or 
degree of risk, taking into consideration economic factors 
and the magnitude of losses that would result from 
failure. 
Casagrande outlined a philosophy by means of a fictitious 
example, which if risk analysis is used in design and 
construction (considerations (a) and (b) together) remains 
valid to this day. Casagrande did not extend his philosophy to 
the assessment of the risk associated with existing 
geotechnical structures, but his description of consideration (a) 
above provides a sound basis for extending his approach to 
such an application. 
Casagrande’s Terzaghi lecture prompted several written 
responses, and probably many unwritten thoughts, several of 
which remain relevant today. However, most of the debate 
centred on experience and practical implications with little 
discussion of the underlying philosophy of risk analysis 
(consideration (a) above). This does not detract from the 
philosophical content of Casagrande’s contribution, rather that 
the philosophical dimension requires expansion. 
Interestingly, in his discussion on Casagrande’s Terzaghi 
lecture, J. H. Stratton (Stratton, 1965) commented as follows: 
“Experience and judgement come with maturity, but maturity 
does not necessarily breed either. The pattern of thought 
followed by the author [Casagrande] in resolving solutions to 
the problems described in his examples represent an orderly 
and analytical process - one far beyond the capabilities of 
most in the profession. ” 
Therefore, and despite differences in terminology and 
application, Casagrande’s insightful treatment of this complex 
Paper No. SOAP - 5 
subject can be considered to be the basis of subsequent 
developments in risk analysis in geotechnical and earthquake 
engineering practice - developments that were slow in coming. 
Investigations - The 70’s. Subsequently in the 1970’s, there 
were several attempts to perform risk analyses for 
geotechnical structures, and theoretical approaches were 
proposed. For dams, most investigations related to hydrologic 
hazards and the use of economic risk analysis concepts in 
sizing spillways, with little emphasis on the response of earth 
dams to seismic loading. It is not clear why seismic 
considerations were not a significant part of the ‘risk debate’ 
for dams in the 1970’s, as Casagrande had clearly identified its 
importance. It may be due to the historical good performance 
of dams during earthquakes, as a review of the statistics of 
dam failures and incidents reveals, despite the seismically 
induced damage caused to the San Fernando Dams by the 
earthquake in February 1971. It also may be due to the 
complexities of the problem and the general ability to deal 
with the problem analytically at that time. 
Importantly, applications of economic risk analysis to dams 
were restricted to situations where there was no threat to life, a 
trend that continues today, although somewhat differently. 
The issue of threat to life and its incorporation in economic 
risk analysis for spillway adequacy was introduced in 1973 
and quickly dismissed by the profession. The idea of 
assigning a monetary value to life was deemed unacceptable 
by the profession at large with the result that risk analysis for 
dams as proposed then, was not taken seriously. 
The 1970’s and also the 1960’s provided significant advances 
in the discipline of ‘Prediction in Geotechnical Engineering’ 
(e.g. Lambe, 1973). Lambe classified predictions in terms of 
three general types, before event, during event and after event, 
with further subdivision of the latter two types depending on 
whether or not the results are known at the time as, illustrated 
in Table I-l. 
Table I-!. ClassiJication ofprediction (after Lambe, 1973) 
Lambe noted “the Profession is in great need of simple 
techniques to make type A predictions. Even though type B 
predictions might be helpful, they are normally not nearly as 
useful as type A predictions. Type C predictions are 
autopsies. Our professional literature contains the results of 
more type CI predictions than of any other type. Autopsies 
can of course be very help@ in contributing to our 
knowledge. However, one must be suspicious when an author 
uses type Cl predictions to ‘prove ’ that any prediction 
technique is correct. ” (Lambe, 1973). In his conclusions, 
Lambe remarked, “We have many power@ tools for solving 
dtJicult problems. Even so, I have become increasingly aware 
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of our limitations. There are many situations where we cannot 
predict the performance of facilities with known reliability. 
We need to continue our experimental and theoretical work to 
improve our understanding of mechanisms and to generate 
simple prediction techniques for the practising engineer ” 
(Lambe, 1973). 
The lack of emphasis on the investigative work of the 70’s in 
this review does not detract from its importance in present day 
applications of risk analysis concepts in geotechnical 
earthquake engineering. The MIT Trial Embankment study 
(Lambe, 1973, Hynes and Vamnarcke, 1976) illustrates the 
challenge in predicting failure for static loading conditions for 
geotechnical structures in terms of conditions which are close 
to ‘controlled’. 
The MIT Trial Embankment revealed the difficulties in 
performing what can be considered to be amongst the most 
straightforward applications of risk analysis alluded to in 
Casagrande’s original work. Clearly, if static loading 
conditions present such analytical difficulties, dynamic 
loading must present even greater challenges. 
INITIAL APPLICATIONS - THE 80’S 
Risk-Based Decision Analysis. The 1980’s saw a drive 
towards more formalised risk-based decision analysis in dam 
safety practice which incorporated benefit-cost analysis and 
which included consideration of seismic issues. Application 
of these economic risk analysis techniques began to receive 
more detailed treatment in the literature in the early 1980’s. 
The term ‘Risk-Based Decision Analysis’, which accurately 
describes what they were, is the term that was used when risk- 
based concepts were applied in (limited) practice. Here, it is 
important to note that what was termed a Risk Assessment in 
Dam Safety Practice in the 1980’s (National Research 
Council, 1983) is what would now be termed a risk estimate. 
They were not risk analyses or risk assessments in terms of 
currently accepted terminology, but they did represent first 
steps in developing the risk analysis framework which 
emerged in the 1990’s. 
This Risk-Based Decision Analysis concept correctly 
identified the basic components of a modern day risk analysis 
as follows: 
. “Identification of the events or sequences of events that 
can lead to dam failure and evaluation of their (relative) 
likelihood of occurrence. 
l Identification of the potential modes offailure that might 
resultfiom the adverse initiating events. 
l Evaluation of the likelihood that a particular mode of dam 
failure will occur given a particular level of loading. 
. Determination of the consequences of failure for each 
potential failure mode. ” 
The methodology had an additional step to calculate the risk 
cost, but this has not been presented here as risk cost is only 
one representation of risk, and it was the representation of 
choice for its intended application. The term (relative) is also 
important as the approach was used for comparison of options 
as opposed to deciding if a dam was safe enough. 
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Whitman’s Proposed Approach. Whitman’s Terzaghi lecture 
(Whitman, 1984), which provided the first insights into what 
was to come in the 90’s, built on the original ideas proposed 
by Casagrande almost twenty years earlier. The lecture 
presented all of the elements of what is now known as 
quantitative risk assessment for dams: 
. Probabilistic hazard analysis 
. Event tree based analysis of dam response 
l Consequence analysis, and 
. Risk evaluation criteria (based on suggestions by G.B. 
Baecher). 
Whitman’s paper included a number of important 
observations, not the least of which is the fact that the overall 
theory is complex. Whitman, recognised Casagrande’s 
concern that while “he [Casagrande] envisioned that it might 
be possible to develop a subjective rating system for dams, he 
worried whether there were enough experienced engineers 
who could be expected to apply such a system in a reliable 
manner”. In response to this concern, Whitman proposed “in 
very preliminary form, a rating system cast in the format of a 
risk to failure. This approach has two facets.. 
I. An event tree to give structure to the ratingprocess. 
2. A set of criteria to guide choice of probabilities at each 
branch of the event tree. ” 
Whitman put forward this approach “not as the answer to the 
very real problem of recognising the riskiness of various 
dams, but to stimulatefurther discussion on the topic. ” 
Whitman’s ideas did not fmd practical application in risk- 
based dam safety decision-making in the 1980’s. The use of 
risk-based approaches relied on the US Bureau of 
Reclamation’s (USBR) procedures as outlined in the 
Guidelines to Decision Analysis (USBR, 1986). Event trees 
remained extremely general in form with no detailed 
decomposition of the failure mechanism. Practical 
applications of risk-based analysis of dams in the 1980’s did 
not adopt the ‘de-compositional’ approach to engineering 
analysis referred to by Baecher et al. (1980) and for which 
Whitman proposed an operational structure. 
Whitman’s General Comments Concerning Risk Evaluation 
was also insightful as it introduced the concept of engineered 
structures being ‘safe enough’ which is now central to goal 
setting types of risk regulation (Bacon, 1998). Whitman also 
rightly observed that engineers should not be solely 
responsible for the evaluation of societal risks from engineered 
structures, rather that they should be participants in a societal 
process. Time has shown the validity of this observation, 
which was not heeded by all at the time or subsequently. 
Applications Of Risk-Based Concepts In Dam Safety. Risk- 
based procedures for prioritisation (McCann et al., 1983) also 
emerged as did risk-benefit analyses for the construction of 
new dams (Pate, 198 1). 
The Tongue River Risk Assessment (PRC, 1986) was an 
important development as it represented the first attempt to 
present dam risk, for discussion purposes, to the Montana 
legislature. The engineering analysis (risk analysis) was 
carried out using the USBR’s procedures, which were 
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described as “the only documented procedures at design 
level. ” Probability estimation was in terms of a combination of 
historical/empirical and judgmental approaches, although the 
process for combining objective and subjective probabilities 
was not described. The Tongue River Risk Assessment 
captured the basic essence of a modem day risk assessment 
without application of the detailed analysis and evaluation 
procedures of the form suggested by Whitman (this did not 
emerge until the 1990’s). 
Interest appeared to be growing outside the water resources 
industry with an application in the mining industry, presented 
by Vick and Bromwell (1989). This case study provided a 
description of how probabilistic risk analysis was used in 
decision-making concerning the design of a dam on Karst in 
Florida. The probability of failure was estimated using the 
fault tree analysis technique and included an estimate of the 
monetary consequences associated with loss-of-life. Typical 
of risk-based analyses of the 1980’s, the results of the study 
were used to inform the owner’s decision-making process. In 
particular, the paper noted: “The geotechnical engineer need 
not be intimidated by lack of expert knowledge or detailed 
information in assigning probabilities that accurately rejlect 
his or her engineering judgement, provided that the failure 
scenario can be decomposed into tractable events amenable to 
evaluation by experience and to investigation by sensitivity 
analyses. ” This view appeared to suggest that the analytical 
and de-compositional difficulties alluded to by Casagrande, 
Whitman, Baecher et al., and others had been overcome. 
Tolerable And UnacceDtable Risk In The 1980’s. During the 
1980’s, publications on risk assessment of dams generally 
avoided the issue of ‘acceptable’ or ‘tolerable’ risk criteria. 
This does not mean that the need for some sort of decision 
criterion was not recognised; it was. However, risk to life was 
not formally addressed by dam safety regulatory authorities, as 
it was generally felt that major dams whose failure would 
result in loss-of-life should be capable of withstanding the 
Maximum Credible Earthquake (MCE). The ‘myth of 
absolute safe@’ embodied in the concept of the Probable 
Maximum Flood (PMF) introduced to assure the body politic 
that the level of flood for which a dam is designed is 
reasonable had and still has its seismic counterpart in the 
MCE. 
Outside the dams industry, the United Kingdom Health and 
Safety Executive published “Tolerability of Risks Tom 
Nuclear Power Stations” and an accompanying “Comments” 
document (HSE, 1988). This presented regulatory recognition 
of the notion of tolerable risk from hazardous facilities and the 
formal description of risk evaluation criteria. The ALARP 
principle, which forms the basis of consideration of what 
constitutes ‘safe enough’, was stated in regulatory terms and 
provided a framework within which risk analysis might be 
carried out. The Tolerability of Risk Document provided the 
basis for life safety criteria proposed for dams in the 1990’s. 
The last part of the ‘pre-1990’s risk analysis historical jigsaw 
puzzle’ was put in place when USBR published its Policies 
and Procedures for Dam Safety ModiJication Decision-making 
which defined a ‘Safe Dam ’ as “one which performs its 
intended functions without imposing unacceptable risks to the 
public by itspresence” (USBR, 1989). 
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It later transpired that the view of tolerability of risk for dams 
that prevailed at that time was overly simplistic, and that 
regulatory involvement would be required to establish the 
principles of Tolerability of Risk for dam safety. 
Immessions from Within the ‘Dam Risk Analvsis 
Communitv’. Overall, a review of the 1980’s dam risk 
literature could give the impression that risk-based dam safety 
decision-making was well established. It appeared that the 
principles of, and framework for, risk assessment, which had 
been developed outside the dams industry, could now be 
broadly applied to dams. The structure of the process was 
well defined, and it required only modification for dam safety 
purposes Bowles (1989). Interest in risk-based decision 
making for dams became so widespread that entire 
conferences on Risk-Based Decision-Making in Water 
Resources, sponsored by the Engineering Foundation and 
supported by several cosponsors were held. The introduction 
to the proceedings of the fourth conference, held in 1989, 
referred to the ‘growing popularity of risk-based decision- 
making “. 
Thus, at the end of the 1980’s, while none of the numerous 
initiatives in risk-based decision-making for dams addressed 
the question Is the dam safe enough?, it appeared that all of 
the components necessary to take this next step were in place, 
at least in principle. In other words, if valid comparisons 
between risk reduction measures could be made and relied on, 
it was thought possible to compare the risk associated with any 
individual option with some objective value of risk which 
quantifies ‘safe enough’. 
A Broader View - Impressions from the ‘Edge and Outside’. 
One might reasonably conclude that conceptually, the 
elements of risk analysis in dam safety assessment, including 
seismic safety assessment had been identified. However, 
certain difficulties with the analytical detail remained. This 
was nothing new. Concerns about the practicality of all 
aspects of risk analysis had been raised since Casagrande first 
introduced the concept of calculated risk, and many remain 
today. Importantly, the enormous difficulties in determining 
probabilities of dam failure through analysis were clearly 
identified. Baecher et al. (1980) provide a useful account of 
the difficulties as follows: ‘Engineering analysis is de- 
compositional. It proceeds by separating the engineering 
design into the mechanisms offailure, analyzing or estimating 
each component of the failure mechanism in isolation, and 
recombining the components according to basic physical 
principles and natural laws. Thus any analytical approach to 
estimating probabilities offailure requires full enumeration of 
failure mechanisms, complete identification of natural events, 
processes or properties aflecting those failure mechanisms, 
and detailed specification of the engineering relationships 
within and among mechanisms. 
The difficulties of analytically estimating probabilities of dam 
failure are that (I) dams can fail through an essentially 
infinite number of mechanisms or modes which cannot be fully 
enumerated, (2) detailed decomposition of dam peflormance 
may lead to events and vpes of physical behaviour that are 
even more difficult to analyse than aggregate per$ormance, 
and (3) even for those mechanisms commonly analysed by 
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engineers, the present models are deterministic. To date, no 
comprehensive attempt at analytical assessment of the 
probability of failure for particular dams has been made. 
Even tf such analyses were possible, because both the 
modeling and the assignment of probabilities are necessarily 
subjective, the results might not be repeatable. 
Perhaps the most severe limitation of analytical approaches is 
due to the fact that most failures of constructed facilities occur 
in ways that cannot be analyzed. Recent studies of the 
historical occurrence of structural failures seem to indicate 
that possibly as few as 10% are attributable to mechanisms 
within the scope of present or prospective methods of 
engineering analysis [quoting Flint et al., 19761. Most 
failures occur due to accident, inadequate construction 
control, or poorly understood physical processes. There is 
every reason to think that this situation also applied to dams. 
Therefore, any analytically derived probability of failure is 
only likely to be a lower bound. 
Analytical predictions of probabilities of failure leading to 
more accurate estimates than that obtained@om the historical 
record do not seem possible at present. Fundamentally, 
analytical procedures suffer from requiring explicit 
identification of failure mechanisms, which cannot be 
completely enumerated. Analytical predictions also suffer by 
the inadequacy of engineering science to explain fully all 
aspects of dam behavior. While future development may 
broaden the applicability of reliability modeling of dams, and 
while certain naturally recurring hazards can be analyzed, 
overall reliance on analytical procedures to obtain 
probabilities of failure seems premature, at best, and may 
actually be logically impossible. ” 
These and other technical difficulties inhibited the application 
of risk analysis in dam safety in the 1980’s. There was 
significant research interest in risk-based decision analysis, 
and a so-called ‘judgmental technique’ aimed at overcoming 
the technical difficulties mentioned above emerged (NRC, 
1983). In terms of the judgmental approach, “the investigator 
attempts to quantify his judgment based on all available 
information. The judgmental statement may be made directly 
in terms of annual probability offailure of the dam due to a 
particular condition (e.g. probability offailure due to internal 
erosion = I x IV3 annually), in terms of the chance offailure 
over a specified remaining operational life of the dam, or as a 
fraction of the probability associated with other modes (e.g., 
about twice the risk attributable to flooding and overtopping). 
However, when the literature on risk-based methods is 
reviewed in the context of dam safety in general, a different 
picture emerges. With the exception of the large self- 
regulating US Federal dam agencies (Bureau of Reclamation 
and Corps of Engineers), involvement of dam owners and dam 
safety regulators in the development of risk-based methods 
was almost non-existent with few actual applications in 
practice. In fact, the wider dam engineering community 
remained highly suspicious, even critical of, risk-based 
approaches to dam safety decision-making. 
Dr. Ralph Peck, widely recognised as having unparalleled 
knowledge and experience in the field of dam design and dam 
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safety was clearly not convinced by the arguments in favour of 
risk-based dam safety. Dr. Peck eloquently and effectively 
expressed his concerns (Peck, 1980, 1982); but he was not 
alone, as similar views were held (and remain held) by the 
majority of dam engineers. In fact, Peck’s 1980 paper “Where 
has all the Judgment Gone?” includes, as a reference, the 
paper by Baecher et al. and the question “‘Where has all the 
Judgement Gone?” follows a discussion on the use of the base 
rate of dam failures of 10e4 as a ‘default value’. 
In his “Comments on Risk Analysis for Dams” where he 
provided strong arguments against proposals Co quantify risks 
posed by dams, Dr. Peck made the following remarks: 
. ‘A risk analysis of a dam having the potential for failing 
by piping would be meaningless if it did not consider 
these [previously discussed] factors, because these are the 
factors that decide the safety of the dam. When the state 
of the art of risk analysis is capable of doing this, I shall 
become an enthusiastic supporter. I think this may be 
possible, and I endorse eflorts to that end. I don ‘t believe 
the time is now. I don ‘t believe the implication of all 
these factors can be quanttfied by asking the most 
qualified experts to choose a number between 1 and IO. 
l In its present state, risk analysis provides powerful 
insights into the relative importance of various factors 
affecting the safety of dams, especially with respect to 
hydrology reservoir operation, and seismic events. Its 
contribution in assessment of stability seems, tfmy former 
colleagues will forgive me, somewhat academic. Its 
application to assessment of the risk of subsuflace erosion 
and piping, especially tf it diminishes design for defense 
in depth, could be dangerous. The experience that leads 
to the art of design for defense in depth is not experience 
that develops an expert in risk analysis; an enormous 
amount of interaction will be needed before I should want 
to see so fundamental a change in design philosophy. ” 
(Peck, 1982) 
In 1983, Dr. Rasmussen (of nuclear power plant fame), when 
invited to speak at a joint Stanford-MIT conference on the 
issue of how risk analysis might be applied to dams, is reputed 
to have expressed the view that not enough is known about 
dams to make a risk analysis of dam failures (Jones, 1999). 
The International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) view 
was as follows: “In most cases, computation of the overall 
probability offailure of a given dam would require so many 
assumptions, affected by such a high degree of uncertainty, 
that the Jinal figure would not be of any practical value for 
project design and a judgement of its safety. ” With regard to 
statistics, the ICOLD position was that “a statistical figure 
derived -from historical records of failure and the number of 
existing dams has no relevance to an individual dam and 
would do injustice to a dam carefully designed, constructed, 
operated and maintained by competent engineers” (ICOLD, 
1987). 
The Utah Power and Light study (Waite, 1989, a) provides 
valuable insights into the regulatory acceptance of Risk-Based 
Decision Analysis (termed a risk assessment) and some of the 
difficulties faced by dam owners. It also provides insight into 
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what would become contentious issues for debate in the 
1990’s - costs of retrofitting dams to ever-increasing 
deterministic safety standards and costs of risk analyses! 
Waite’s open and IYank description of the discomfort of the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is as follows: 
“FERC staff was uncomfortable with our decision, and they 
have our sympathy in this regard. We think they visualized the 
result, could be a whitewash of genuine safety problems, 
inadvertently or intentionally superficial, politically 
controversial, and not result in a truly balanced evaluation or 
solution. They seemed particularly concerned that the 
technical and economic review would have insuficient depth 
to provide an eflective information base and that insuficient 
information was generally available to make reliable risk 
judgments. Thley said such a “risk assessment” would miss 
too many factors and details, currently handled as intangible 
factor-of-safety components, and result in a rislry model. Even 
tf we did a proper job on the evaluation, we think that FERC 
was concerned about a possible precedent that would allow 
later, less well founded work by others jeopardize industry 
safety standards. The decision to go ahead with the risk 
assessment was executed with mixed feelings within our own 
organization too. ” (Waite, 1989, a). 
Waite also provided some useful insights into lessons learned 
from the study. Two valuable insights, one posed as a 
question were: 
. “Procedurally, did the study go as anticipated? No, not 
entirely. Personally, ifI had to do it again, I would insist 
on physical evaluation of the facilities condition being 
given greater emphasis. Ifyou don’t examine existing 
conditions closely, you willprobably learn your lesson 
later. 
. Don’t short change the development of the details in a risk 
assessment. ” (Waite 1989, b). 
The State-of-the-ArVPractice in the 1980’s. The literature on 
risk analysis for dams presents a broad spectrum of views 
ranging 6om creating the impression that there were no 
difficulties to be resolved at one end of the spectrum to 
insurmountable problems at the other. A balanced and 
informed view can only be obtained from a broad, in-depth 
examination of all of the issues involved. Clearly, while such 
a treatment is beyond the scope of this paper, the review 
suggests that, at the end of the 1980’s, fundamental theoretical 
and practical difficulties existed which would have to be 
resolved before risk analysis could become an established and 
accepted process for analysing the safety of dams. The unique 
nature of dams, the poor understanding of the causes of 
failure, the complex nature of risk and the general problem of 
experience referred to by Casagrande, clearly posed enormous 
problems. The task that existed at the start of the 1990’s of 
resolving these difficulties in a generally acceptable, 
mathematically correct and scientifically valid way to permit 
risk analysis for dams to become an accepted practice was not 
a trivial one. 
The difficulties that have been identified do not mean that the 
activities of the 1970’s and 1980’s were not of considerable 
value; they were, but they did not meet the overall objective of 
determining if a dam is safe enough. I hold the view that 
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significant advances in understanding of risk analysis of dams 
were achieved during the first twenty-five year period since 
Casagrande proposed the concept. The research and 
development work carried out at MIT, Stanford and other 
centres of learning, together with that carried out by the 
Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers provided a 
conceptual base horn which to work. The pioneering 
applications of the concepts embodied in the USBR’s 
Guidelines to Decision Analysis provided the basis of future 
applications of risk analysis in formal assessment of risk posed 
by dams. 
This said, the ‘State-of-the-Art/Practice of risk analysis of 
dams at the end of the 1980’s had not progressed to formal 
risk assessment, although the Tongue River Dam Risk 
Assessment had captured most of the essential features, 
without the benefit of the vitally important detailed analytical 
probability estimation processes and the risk evaluation 
component. An interesting feature of the ‘State-of-the- 
Art/Practice’ at the end of the 1980’s was that, for practical 
purposes, the analytical procedures had not really evolved 
during the decade. Of the three basic approaches to estimating 
dam response probabilities: 
I. The analytical @robability) approach, 
2. The empirical (historical frequency) approach, and, 
3. The judgmental approach 
a combination of the latter two were used throughout the 
decade (e.g. Bowles, 1989). 
Although not stated explicitly, the three approaches to 
probability estimation were treated as equivalent with NRC 
(NRC, 1983) clearly stating that “a combination of empirical 
and judgmental approaches appears to be most practical at 
the present time. However, the validity of this assertion was 
not demonstrated, and it does require the questionable mixing 
of the objective and subjective philosophies of probability 
theory. 
The procedure was as follows (NRC, 1983): 
. “‘Historical failure probabilities can be obtained for 
specific conditions and types of structures, but they need 
to be adjusted based on the conditions at a particular 
dam. 
. This adjustment is based on the inspection, analysis, and 
judgment of the engineers pellforming the safety 
evaluation of the dam. 
. The two estimates may be combined by means of a 
Bayesian updating procedure in which a weight is 
assigned to the relative confidence in each of the 
estimates (historical and engineer s judgment). ” 
Of course, such a procedure cannot be applied in the absence 
of historical data on dam failures, something that is extremely 
sparse for seismically induced failures. Further and probably 
even more importantly, the procedure overlooks the simple 
fact that none of the dams in the database have the “historical 
failure probability”. Historical failure probability (frequency) 
is a mathematical property of the population of failed dams as 
a proportion of the total (a small number of l’s and a larger 
number of O’s). The weighting procedure (step 3) also raises 
questions concerning how the engineer makes the estimate as 
it is already a weighted version (site-specific adjustments up 
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or down) of the historical frequency (step 1). Of course, the 
procedure breaks down completely if the historical failure 
frequency for a particular class of dam and hazard is zero 
because judgment is based on knowledge, and knowledge is 
familiarity gained by actual experience, directly or indirectly 
through others (DiBiagio and Hoeg, 1989). Another difficulty 
relates to the non-intuitive nature of probability and the 
numerous examples of ‘judgments’ of probability being 
spectacularly wrong! 
The risk estimation procedure was generally represented by a 
three-step process, which towards the end of the 1980’s was 
often illustrated in a simplified three-step event tree where the 
system response was modelled in two steps as illustrated in 
Fig. I-2. Event trees of this nature, and this particular example, 
are simply graphical illustrations of the tabular representation 
of the example presented in Appendix A of the USBR’s 1986 
Embankment Dams Design Standard No. 13, Chapter 14, 
Guidelines on Decision Analysis (USBR, 1984), as previously 
described by NRC (NRC, 1983). 
Considering all of the above, the process whereby reliable 
estimates of response probabilities for individual, unique 
dams, concerning events that are beyond experience and not 
readily analysed, using statistics from a sparse and 
heterogeneous database can be ‘judged’ was not at all clear. 
What was also not clear was the meaning of these ‘blended 
probabilities’. 
Probabilities of system response were typically assigned using 
the ‘judgmental’ approach with sensitivity studies carried out 
to determine the sensitivity of the outcome to these variations 
in inputs. The accounts of how these judgmental probabilities 
are arrived at generally refer to probabilities being estimated 
based on engineering analysis, experience and judgement 
(NRC, 1983, and Bowles, 1989) without applying a procedure 
of the type suggested by Whitman. Importantly, applications 
of risk analysis in dam safety in the 1980’s did not employ the 
‘type A ’ predictive models referred to by Lambe (Lambe, 
1973). 
Further and importantly, the significant advances in 
geotechnical earthquake engineering, and in particular the 
advances in liquefaction, were not employed in risk analyses 
for dams even though liquefaction risk was amenable, in 
principle at any rate, to quantification (NRC, 1985, a, Liao et 
al, 1988). In many respects, advances in geotechnical and 
earthquake engineering were not finding widespread 
application in risk analysis for dams. 
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Fig. I-2 Simplified Event Tree for Hypothetical Dam 
Considering Hydrologic Loading (afrer Bowles et al. I987) 
In summary, interest in risk-based decision-making did not 
translate into action in any significant way in the 1980’s. 
What was termed ‘risk assessment’ in the dam industry was 
actually what had become generally known as a grossly 
simplified form of risk estimation in other hazardous 
industries. This ‘generally loose’ use of terminology was a 
source of considerable confusion. The State-of-the- 
Art/Practice of risk analysis in the 1980’s was essentially 
established prior to 1983and applied by the USBR (NRC, 
1983). The NRC view (NRC, 1985, b) was that “the 
quantitative risk-cost analysis approach has been applied to 
very f&v dams and is such a recent development that it can be 
barely calIed “current practice I’. 
In general, proponents of risk-based methods were generally 
unsuccessful in providing convincing, scientifically based 
arguments to advance the concept to routine practice. The 
profession was clearly divided, and there was no regulatory 
acceptance of risk assessment in dam safety practice. 
Applications of risk-based methods were the exception rather 
than the norm, the scientific and theoretical basis for the 
analysis methods had not been established in an engineering 
sense, and none of the applications answered the question “Is 
the dam safe enough? ” 
Level Of Interest In Risk-Based Dam Safetv Decision- 
Making. Towards the late 1980’s dam owners, faced with 
ever increasing design standards for dams, began to show an 
interest in risk-based decision-making. Many owners were 
faced with the prospect of ever increasing costs associated 
with retrofitting their dams to meet new design standards. The 
cost of retrofitting old dams to new standards tends to be 
enormous, with benefit-cost ratios generally substantially less 
than 1.0. The economics of dam safety simply did not add up, 
and it was not possible to develop business cases for dam 
safety improvements in the normal way. The situation faced 
by Utah Power and Light (Waite, 1989, a) was not unique. 
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FIRST STEPS IN FORMAL RISK ANALYSIS AND RISK 
ASSESSMENT - THE EARLY 1990’S 
BC Hydro, the Provincially owned hydroelectric utility of 
British Columbia, was the frost major dam owner to seriously 
attempt to answer the questions How Safe is the Dam?...Is it 
Safe Enough? using risk assessment techniques. G.M. 
Salmon, BC Hydro’s Director of Dam Safety initially sought 
assistance 6om the USBR’s Mr. J. L. Von Thun who had been 
heavily involved in developing the USBR’s Risk-Based 
Guidelines on Decision Analysis. Early on (1991) Salmon 
suggested that it might be possible to measure the safety of a 
dam in terms of the expected value of the loss. Recognising 
the immense difficulties associated with monetising the value 
of human life, Salmon proposed that life safety be considered 
separately 6om monetary losses. He suggested that an 
expected value for loss of life Elire loss > 0.001 lives/dam/year 
would constitute a level of risk to the public that would be 
unacceptable (BC Hydro, 1991). The commencement of BC 
Hydro’s initiative coincided with the publication of the 
Canadian Standards Association’s National Standard on Risk 
Analysis Requirements and Guidelines (Canadian Standards 
Association (CSA), 199 1). 
Salmon recognised that analytical procedures would be 
necessary to make reasonable estimates of the risk posed by a 
dam, and he instituted a major development initiative aimed at 
determining the risk posed by dams by means of analytical 
techniques. BC Hydro took on the challenge of advancing the 
state of knowledge beyond the grossly simplified approaches 
of risk estimation used in the existing risk-based decision 
analysis technique by moving to de-compositional analysis. 
A number of projects were initiated to investigate how to 
estimate probabilities of: 
. Extreme loads on dams (large earthquakes and floods) 
. Dam responses and failure mechanisms, and 
l Dam failure consequences. 
A separate project was initiated to provide a framework for the 
risk assessment process to integrate the various analytical 
components, to establish potential risk-based decision criteria 
through a risk evaluation process, and to assess the risk posed 
by the dam to determine if it is safe enough. 
In keeping with BC Hyclro’s tradition of bringing an 
appropriate level of expertise to bear on difficult dam 
engineering problems, BC Hydro engaged advisory panels of 
internationally recognised experts in the various disciplines 
involved to guide the investigations. The projects were led by 
BC Hydro senior engineering staff supplemented by 
consultants. Originally, it was not intended to develop new 
theoretical models and analytical techniques, but rather to 
build on existing techniques by adapting them to suit the types 
of problems in hand. In this regard, the probabilistic seismic 
hazard analysis studies were relatively straightforward as 
analytical techniques had been introduced over twenty years 
previously and subsequently refined. By 1992, BC Hydro had 
performed ‘basic’ probabilistic hazard analyses, as depicted in 
(Fig. I-3), for all of its dam sites. 
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The ‘basic’ approach to characterising the seismic hazard at a 
dam site was the principal method used in dam risk analyses in 
the 1990’s. While useful for providing an initial estimate of 
the seismic hazard, the technique falls short of full 
probabilistic characterisation of the risk. 1995 saw a move 
towards more comprehensive characterisation of the seismic 
hazard by including explicit treatment of the aleatory and 
epistemic uncertainties, as shown in Fig. I-4. 
Fig. I-3. Basic Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (1992) 
Elements of Enhanced PtiSA 
Fig. I-4 ‘Enhanced ’ Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis 
(since 1995 at BC Hydro) 
The first ‘experiment’ using the de-compositional event tree 
approach was carried out on BC Hydro’s Terzaghi Dam. 
However, the study raised more questions than it provided 
answers, and it was terminated without being brought to a 
conclusion. Therefore it was not possible to draw any 
conclusions about the validity of the analysis method or to 
make any inferences concerning the safety of the dam on the 
basis of this study. BC Hydro consented to the publication of 
brief accounts of the principles involved in this analysis (e.g. 
Vick and Stewart, 1996) with the view to gauging the reaction 
of the profession. This consent does not constitute 
endorsement of either the method of analysis or any inferences 
that might be made concerning the safety status of the dam. 
In early 1993, the general feeling in BC Hydro’s engineering 
group was that estimation of risk through analytical means 
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was easier said than done. Analysis of risk through 
decomposition of the various aspects of the physical 
phenomena involved into their tindamental components was 
recognised as being extremely difficult and required very 
significant effort and expertise. This realisation cast serious 
doubts as to the validity of existing ‘judgmental’ estimation of 
dam response probabilities. In summary, the question “lf Ihe 
problem is difficult to analyse, then how can one make 
reasonable judgements of the probable response of the dam to 
extreme loads?” arose and was one of the most vexing 
questions raised by these pilot studies as it called into question 
the methods used to estimate probabilities in existing risk- 
based decision analysis methodologies. 
BC Hydro’s engineers understood that to succeed it would be 
necessary to develop robust ‘de-compositional’ models of dam 
failure mechanisms. This required that they address issues 
deemed by others (e.g. Peck, 1980, Baecher et al, 1980) to be 
‘nigh on impossible ‘. With the added complication that, even 
if general theories of dam failure could be developed, they 
would necessarily require refinement to account for the unique 
features of each dam and dam site. Although these pilot 
studies did not provide scientifically based analytical 
techniques that could be applied with confidence, they did 
suggest that it might be possible to estimate risks posed by 
dams along the lines suggested by Whitman. The ‘apparent 
alternative’ was to fix tindamental mathematical and 
philosophical problems with the ‘empirical/judgmental’ 
approach to estimating dam response probabilities. This 
course of action was ruled out, not just because of the 
intractability of the mathematical problems but also because it 
was clearly understood that the event tree model of the failure 
process and the probabilities assigned at nodes in the tree were 
inextricably linked (Hartford and Salmon, 1995). This 
problem here being that the ‘probability’ is an artefact of the 
model and the manner in which epistemic and aleatory 
uncertainty are represented. 
BC Hydro’s framework for risk assessment was established in 
September 1993 in the form of ‘Interim Guidelines ‘, which 
included a trial example of an event tree analysis for extreme 
floods and earthquakes (BC Hydro, 1993). The Interim 
Guidelines were presented for discussion within the 
profession, and summary papers were issued over the next two 
years. Shortly thereafter in January 1994 and entirely 
independently, the Australian National Committee on Large 
Dams (ANCOLD) issued Guidelines on Risk Assessment for 
Dams (ANCOLD, 1994). The ANCOLD guidelines and the 
BC Hydro Interim Guidelines were conceptually very similar. 
According to ANCOLD, “the immediate objective of many of 
those advocating risk assessment in current practice is to 
provide defensible design solutions as economic optima that 
are likely to be of lower cost than those that result from a 
traditional engineering standards approach to design. ” 
At the time, this analysis work did not meet with any serious 
objections, and this created the impression that all of the 
problems of analysing risk posed by dams had been resolved. 
In other words, it appeared that the concerns of Casagrande, 
Peck and others as well as the issues outlined by Baecher et al. 
might have been adequately addressed. This is not to say that 
there was not scepticism; there was (e.g. Fanelli, 1991, Lafitte, 
Although not known at the time, this was the ‘Kent Chart’ 
approach to quantifying verbal descriptions of probability 
which had previously been tried and subsequently abandoned 
by US military intelligence (Cooke, 1991), Further, the 
approach did not find much in the way of acceptance in 
Australia where investigations into risk analysis were also 
being carried out. The issue of assigning a probability P = 0.5 
as representing uncertainty raised the most serious concerns 
’ Vick subsequently revised the descriptor adding that the condition that there 
*as no preference for either outcome. 
’ The US Bureau of Reclamation uses the term ‘neutral’ to describe ho 
preference for eirher outcome’. 
Paper No. SOAP - 5 11 
1992, 1993, Lombardi, 1993, Ruggeri et al., 1993), but the 
written objections were not specific to the method of analysis. 
Further, risk assessment, which includes the use of risk 
analysis to address life safety issues for dams, did generate 
significant critical comment. However discussion of these 
broader policy issues is beyond the scope of this paper. 
This lack of adverse comment on the analytical procedures 
was of concern to me and other BC Hydro staff, as initiatives 
of this nature are inevitably controversial. Given the divisions 
in the profession, the almost unquestioned acceptance of the 
approach by sections of the dam engineering community was 
disconcerting. This lack of adverse comment concerning the 
analytical procedures could not be interpreted as general 
acceptance of risk assessment. Absence of evidence cannot be 
interpreted as evidence of absence! 
One section of the dam safety profession appeared to accept 
that dam failure processes could be described by a relatively 
small number of failure modes: two extreme-event failure 
mode initiators, earthquake and flood, and one general ‘static’ 
failure mode. Further, there was little or no delbate concerning 
the difference between this ‘de-compositional’ approach and 
the ‘empiricaYjudgmenta1’ approach. The de-compositional 
models of failure mechanisms for each failure mode appeared 
to be accepted at face value; partly it seems because the 
models depicted generally accepted descriptions of failure 
mechanisms. The question as to whether or not the failure 
mechanism was fully decomposed into its fundamental parts 
required attention. 
In BC Hydro’s early risk analysis ‘experimenfls’, probabilities 
were assigned using the scheme proposed by Vick (1992) for 
transforming verbal descriptions of the ‘degree-of-belief of 
the study team to numerical values. SuccessM application of 
this mapping scheme depends on Bernoulli’s Principle of 
Indifference being valid. 
1 Verbal descrintor 1 Pkobabilitv 
Event is virtually certain 
Event is very likely 
0.99 
0.9 
1 Completely and totally uncertain’. ’ 1 0.5 I 
7-- 
Event is very unlikely 0. I 
Event is virtually impossible but cannot 0.01 
be physically ruled out 
Table I-2. Mapping scheme suggested by Vick (I 992) 
P = 0.5 occurs in many problems of probability, the most well 
known one being flipping coins. However, hidden in much 
literature discussion of the meaning of P = 0.5 is Bernoulli’s 
“Principle of Insufficient Reason” (the name is due to Von 
Kries -(Howson and Urbach, 1991)). Keynes (Keynes, 193 1) 
described it, the “Principle of Indifference”, a description 
also preferred by modem philosophers (Howson and Urbach, 
1991). 
According to Keynes; “The principle of indifference asserts 
that ifthere is no known reason forpredicating of our subject 
one rather than another of several alternatives, then relative 
to such knowledge the assertion of each of these alternatives 
have an equal probability. Thus equal probabilities must be 
assigned to each of several arguments, if there is an absence 
ofpositive grounds for assigning unequal ones “. 
Keynes was highly critical of Bernoulli’s principle, largely 
because it leads to paradoxical and contradictory conclusions. 
He quoted several, but the engineering/scientific example 
attributed to Von Kries presented by Keynes and reproduced 
below provides a useful insight into one of the many 
difficulties. 
“Consider the specific volume of a given substance. Let us 
suppose that we know the spec$c volume to lie between I and 
3, but we have no information as to whereabouts in this 
interval its exact value is to be found. The principle of 
indifference would allow us to assume that it is as Iikely to lie 
between I and 2 as between 2 and 3; for there is no reason for 
supposing that it lies in one interval rather than in the other. 
But now consider the specific density. The specific density is 
the reciprocal of the specif;c volume, so that if the latter is v, 
the former is I/v. Our data remaining as before, we know that 
the specific density must lie between I and IN. and, by the 
same use of the principle of indifference as before, that it is as 
likely to be between 1 and 2/3 and 2/3 and l/3. But the 
specific volume being a determinate function of the specific 
density, tf the iatter lies between I and 2/3, the former lies 
between I and 1%. and if the latter lies between 2/3 and l/3, 
the former lies between 1% and 3. It follows, therefore, that 
the specific volume is as likely to lie between 1 and I % as 
between 1% and 3; whereas we have already proved, 
relatively to precisely the same data, that it is as likely to lie 
between 1 and 2 as between 2 and 3. I’ 
Von Kries’ complete treatment was not left uncriticised but 
according to Keynes, the criticism could not “restore the credit 
of the principle of indifference”. Keynes continued, 
“Moreover, any other firnction of the specific volume would 
have suited our purpose equally well, and by a suitable choice 
of thisfitnction we might have proved in a similar manner that 
any division whatever of the interval 1 to 3 yields sub-intervals 
of equal probability. Specific volume and speciJic density are 
simply alternative methods of measuring the same objective 
quantity; and there are many methods which might be 
adopted, each yielding on the application of the principle of 
indifference a different probability for a given obj’ective 
variation in the quantity. ” 
The specific volume/density example is just one of a great 
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many instances where the principle of indierence produces 
untenable outcomes, and this example illustrates just one of 
the many issues that one needs to be cogrrisant of when 
assigning P = 0.5. 
Ironically, Keynes, in an attempt to overcome the problem of 
inconsistency inherent in the Principle of Indifference, 
developed his own version; however, he did not succeed in 
overcoming the fundamental problems with the concept. 
One of the dilemmas that all of this poses for risk analysts is 
as follows: 
Compare the case where all of the evidence shows that 50% of 
the evidence supports a proposition and 50% supports its 
antithesis with that of the case where there is no evidence to 
support the hypothesis or its antithesis and therefore no reason 
to prefer one hypothesis over the other. Perfect knowledge 
and complete ignorance are represented by the same 
‘Probability’. 
Some challenges associated with the above discussion on 
probability is that dam risk analysts need to clearly explain 
and communicate: 
. What they mean by probability 
. How they assemble the evidence 
l What they mean by P = 0.5, and 
. How they translate the evidence into numerical values of 
probability. 
“Before the ascendance of the modem theory, the notion of 
equal probabilities was often used as synonymous for “no 
advanced knowledge. ” (Feller, 1968). There is no place for 
Bernoulli’s Principle of Indifference in the modem theory of 
probability, although an analogous principle holds in the 
probability of gambling. This is an important distinction as 
‘indifference’ concerning the outcome of a gamble and ‘equal 
weights of evidence’. 
In addition to the problem with P = 0.5, the mapping scheme 
did not clearly outline that the probability was a measure of 
the degree of confidence that the individuals had in their belief 
in the outcome at each node in the event tree. 
By 1994, the ‘trial’ approach to dam risk analysis that BC 
Hydro was experimenting with became a ‘commodity 
engineering’ service. It was possible for owners to issue 
requests for proposals for what appeared to be the BC Hydro 
type of risk analysis service and to receive offers to perform 
the work. In-house engineering staff in other utilities also 
began to implement the approach. However, BC Hydro’s 
Interim Guidelines, which for many was a principal source of 
reference, contained the results of only one pilot study and 
importantly, the procedures for conducting the analysis were 
not included as they had not been developed. However the 
situation was rather more complex and any impression that 
quantitative risk analysis could be treated as a routine 
engineering service was clearly without foundation. 
At the early stages, BC Hydro’s strategy was to apply existing 
or proposed methods of analysis to a wide range of dam safety 
issues. One objective of this strategy was to use the insights 
generated to enhance on-going dam safety decision-making. 
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A second objective was to identify through experience of 
application, the strengths and weaknesses of existing or 
proposed risk analysis methodologies. The ‘practice’ that 
emerged in 1994 had been established in the absence of the 
necessary investigations into the strengths and weaknesses of 
the proposed method. Further, the ‘practice’ was not 
necessarily delivering the proposed ‘BC Hydro’ approach. 
The approach that emerged in the State of Victoria in Australia 
for portfolios of dams was a hybrid of the USBR’s risk-based 
decision analysis and the BC Hydro decision criteria. (e.g. 
SMECRAC, 1995, Watson et al., 2000). Although termed risk 
assessments, these approaches are not risk assessments in the 
accepted sense, and no analytical procedures were used to 
estimate the risk. 
Because its dam safety program was quite mature and most of 
the obvious issues had been identified through the use of 
traditional methods of analysis, BC Hydro also had an interest 
in the many aspects of dam safety decision-making not readily 
addressed by conventional analytical methods. Risk analysis 
was seen as having the potential to extend conventional dam 
safety analysis to consider the dam as a system and to consider 
all aspects of behaviour in a consistent manner. 
The successful application of risk analysis in any dam safety 
program requires the development of a robust and fully 
integrated general set of theories of dam failure processes. It 
also requires the development of a database of experience and 
evidence to validate the theories, and to make possible the 
exercise of judgement by suitably experienced dam engineers 
for application in specific cases. 
In 1994, as part of its strategy, in response to concerns 
expressed by some of BC Hydro’s engineering staff, and in the 
absence of significant criticism of the proposed analytical 
procedures, BC Hydro’s risk analysis project staff began to 
investigate the validity of various aspects of the analysis 
procedures. 
Some of the reasons for the concerns were: 
1. Pilot analyses of concrete dams tended to produce much 
shorter event trees and much higher failure probabilities 
than earthtill dams, especially under earthquake and flood 
loading conditions. This led to the inference that concrete 
dams were much more vulnerable than earthfill dams, an 
inference that is not supported by the historic evidence of 
the generally better performance of concrete dams! 
2. The estimate of risk was found to be highly dependent on 
how the failure process was modelled. 
3. In some cases, the estimate of risk was found to be highly 
dependent on the individuals estimating the probabilities, 
with no means of discriminating between estimators. 
4. In other cases, the estimate of risk was not sensitive to the 
probabilities assigned if complementary paths at certain 
nodes in the event tree model led to failure. 
5. In most cases, the pilot analyses indicated that the risk 
associated with combinations of conditions associated 
with less than the most extreme earthquakes and floods 
constituted the highest proportion of the risk. Here again, 
it was not clear if this phenomenon was an artefact of the 
model and the people making the estimate. 
6. There was concern that the estimate of risk was an 
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artefact of: 
. The event tree. 
. The scheme for assigning probabilities. 
. The knowledge and biases of the person assigning the 
probabilities and not a ‘measure’ of the safety of the 
dam. 
Other issues included: 
. The need to demonstrably and effectively address the 
concerns of the various eminent experts who had 
previously cast doubts as to the feasibility ~of risk analysis. 
. The clearly identified difference in level of effort between 
analytically derived probabilities and ‘judgmental’ 
probabilities. 
l The compatibility of estimates of failure probabilities 
made using analytical techniques and the ‘judgmental’ 
estimates made in terms of the procedures outlined by 
NRC (NRC, 1983) and still used in practiae (SMECALAC, 
1995). 
An underlying concern can be summarised as: “Is this too 
good to be true?” It appeared that teams of dam safety 
engineers could assign ‘subjective probabilitie$’ based on their 
‘degree-of-belief in a hypothesis and be able to quantify the 
risk due to all dam failure modes in about a week! This was 
achieved in the absence of: 
. Expertise or training in probabilistic reasoning. 
. A statistically valid empirical database of failure modes 
mechanisms and frequencies. 
l Robust theories of dam failures. 
. Demonstrably fully decomposed models of the failure 
processes. 
Another concern of mine was that “the grossly simplified 
‘judgmental’ approach could be applied with even less effort 
even though probability is notoriously complex with numerous 
examples of probability playing tricks with ones intuition and 
‘judgement’“. 










The scientific validity of the de-compositional models of 
the failure mechanisms. 
The mathematical and philosophical basis of the 
interpretation of ‘subjective probability’ as applied in the 
analyses. 
The scientific validity of the process for estimating 
‘judgmental probabilities’ as assigned by analysis teams. 
The interaction between the extent of decomposition of 
the failure mechanism and the estimate of risk 
Expertise, experience and knowledge requirements of 
analysis teams. 
Site specific information needs for input to analysis 
models. 
Could anything be done to make the probability estimates 
‘tamper-proof and not open to manipulation? 
The validity of comparing subjective estimates of risk 
with objective decision criteria. 
Was the process of estimating ‘judgmental’ probabilities 
really the exercise of judgement or was it something less 
and if so how much less? 
10. What did the subjective estimates of probability and 
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resulting risk estimates actually mean and what can they 
be used for? 
11. Did the risk analysis process, as implemented, actually 
lead to a better understanding of the performance of the 
dam under all possible conditions or was the claimed 
‘improved understanding’ simply a perception of those 
involved? 
12. Could dam owners rely on risk analysis as a component of 
a dam safety decision-making process? 
Clearly, given the broad range of issues to be addressed and 
questions to be answered, it would have been inappropriate not 
to address them to the fullest possible extent. At the same 
time, BC Hydro felt that the appropriate approach was to 
continue performing a limited number of risk analyses, while 
gradually addressing the issues of concern. 
In 1993/94, BC Hydro performed a risk analysis for 
seismically induced liquefaction of the foundation soils of its 
Murrin 2 Substation. The method of estimating the probability 
of liquefaction proposed by Liao et al. (Liao et al., 1988) 
provided the basis for the analysis, and Professor Whitman 
was engaged to review the work. The geotechnical properties 
of the site had been extensively investigated, and there was a 
considerable amount of information about the performance of 
similar substation structures and equipment during 
earthquakes. 
Prior to the risk analysis, a Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA), facilitated by consultant Steven G. Vick, 
was conducted. All of the technical disciplines involved in 
determining the effects of earthquakes on the electric system 
was represented as were the field staff who operate the system 
and managers who would plan the response. The FMEA 
provided the necessary precursory collection and formatting of 
information necessary to proceed to the risk analysis phase. 
This exercise led to BC Hydro adopting the position that 
FMEA should be considered as an essential precursor to more 
detailed risk analysis studies rather than the more subjective, 
unstructured ‘failure mode screening’ typically carried out in 
dam safety risk analyses. 
In conducting the risk analysis phase, BC Hydro’s engineering 
staff departed from the ‘workshop’ approach to constructing 
event trees and assigning subjective probabilities as attempted 
for dam safety risk analyses. Instead, the engineers 
responsible for the project developed a framework to analyse 
the risk and implemented the ‘de-compositional’ approach to 
engineering analysis from the top down. The seismic risk 
problem for the substation as a whole was ‘decomposed’ into 
discipline-based tasks. The discipline-based tasks provided 
the sub-frameworks for the ‘de-compositional’ engineering 
analysis of each aspect of the problem to be carried out. The 
discipline-based tasks were: 
1. Probabilistic seismic hazard analysis 
2. Probability of liquefaction analysis 
3. Ground deformation analysis given liquefaction 
4. Ground shaking analysis given no liquefaction 
5. Structural response analysis given deformation and 
shaking 
6. Structural response analysis given shaking 
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7. Damage states analysis 
8. Times to repair analysis 
Owing to the nature of the problem, and experience obtained 
from California and Japan, the necessary theop-ies and models 
were available to perform the analysis (Garner et al., 1998). 
The probability of liquefaction of the foubdation fills is 
illustrated in Fig. I-5. 
u- 
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Fig. I-5. Probability of liquefaction ofjoundationJills (after 
Garner el al., I998) 
Ground failure phenomena resulting from liquefaction were 
expected to have several forms-flow slides, settl 
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ment and lateral 
spreading. Lateral spreading occurring in near- iquefied soils is 
considered the most important ground failure m@chanism for this 
site. 
Three deterministic methods and one linear re@ression method 
were evaluated to establish the most appropdate method for 
determining the potential ground movements. pe Bartlett and 
Youd method (Bartlett and Youd, 1992) for computing lateral 
spreading was chosen as the preferred method of analysis. 
Bartlett and Youd’s process requires estimation of the ground 
surface PGA which includes amplification effec$s (Garner et al., 
1988). 
The results were presented as F-N curves of probability of 
substation outages greater than ‘N’ hours. It quickly became 
obvious that risk represented in this way was as much an 
artefact of the way the data is presented a$ it is the risk 
analysis. 
Discussion of this issue is unfortunately beyond the scope of 
this paper but is mentioned here as F-N curvtz~s for life safety 
considerations for dams began to appear around this time 
(ANCOLD, 1994). Despite clear problem4 with the F-N 
representation of risk and warnings that it may not be suitable 
for situations such as dam failures (HSE, 1999), it remains a 
preferred representation of risk to life by some proponents. 
The Murrin Substation Risk Analysis demonstrated that, in 
principle, the analytical techniques were available to permit 
the probability of failure of earth dams to be determined by 
analytical means. The next stage in the development of 
analytical methods of quantifying the risk posed by dams was 
to perform a feasibility study by applying these techniques to a 
dam. This feasibility study led to the Keenleyside Dam risk 
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analysis, which (as far as I am aware) is the only analytically 
based risk analysis of a dam to be completed to date. Details 
are presented in Part II of this paper. 
In 1995, the USBR joined BC Hydro in its quest for the 
answer to the question How Safe Is The Dam?... Is it Safe 
Enough? In order to get started in risk assessment and build 
on the concepts embodied in their 1989 Policies and 
Procedures for Dam Safety Decision-making, the USBR 
invited Dr. M.G. Schaefer, Mr. G. Salmon and myself to 
present a workshop on risk assessment in dam safety practice. 
Dr. Schaefer had led the development of the State of 
Washington’s Risk-Based approach to dam safety decision- 
making and was and still is active in the field of quantifying 
probabilities of extreme precipitation events. 
Towards the end of 1995, BC Hydro published (Hartford and 
Salmon, 1995) some of its concerns about the difficulties 
associated with de-compositional risk analysis and simplified 
‘degree of belief approaches to probability estimation. At the 
same time, a feasibility study of the probability of liquefaction 
failure of Keenleyside Dam was carried out using the method 
of analysis pioneered in the Murrin Substation risk analysis. 
Investigations into simplified approaches to specific problems 
continued. Also, a firm of consultants was commissioned to 
perform a comprehensive quantitative risk analysis of a 
concrete dam for all possible failure modes. Despite an 
unprecedented level of effort, it was not possible to bring the 
risk analysis of the concrete dam to a robust conclusion. 
Further, all of the investigations into simplified approaches 
failed to provide a satisfactory means of quantifying risk. 
THE WATERSHED YEARS: 1995 - 1998 
In recognition of the difficulties described above, BC Hydro 
adopted a dual strategy (simplified and detailed) of research 
and development. This involved continued investigations into 
simplified (practical) approaches with parallel investigations 
into rigorous methods for estimating risks posed by concrete 
and earthfill dams. The most unusual feature of the early 
1990’s effort was the concerted attempt to develop a ‘practice’ 
without first establishing its theoretical foundations. We 
recognised that we were essentially trying to develop 
guidelines for risk analysis in dam safety practice in advance 
of the usual period of ‘trial and error’. What transpired was 
the ‘Achilles heel’ of the early 1990’s attempts to introduce 
risk analysis as a professional dam safety service. 
The ‘simplified path’ recognised the need for pragmatic 
approaches to risk management to be applied generally in 
practice in an efficient and effective way. The ‘detailed path’ 
was based on the principle that ‘you only genuinely know if 
you have taken a short cut if you have previously reached the 
same destination by a longer route’. Essentially we had gone 
back to the fundamental philosophies of geotechnical 
engineering practice as espoused by Terzaghi in his 
Theoretical Soil Mechanics and repeated in Soil Mechanics in 
Engineering Practice. 
The strategy required several simultaneous studies, and it also 
presented an opportunity to examine how different 
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professional groups addressed the difficult &sues involved. 
Most investigations were carried out by BC Hydro staff 
supported by consultants ranging from a highly specialised 
team focusing on one hazard and one failure mode, to teams of 
generalists using simplified approaches carrying out 
multidisciplinary studies. The concrete dam study, which was 
the largest and most comprehensive, was awarded to a firm of 
consultants. 
This strategy differed from the general trend adopted by most 
other investigators who favoured simplified approaches to 
failure mechanism modelling, empirical formulae and 
‘empirical/judgmental approaches. At the same time (1996), 
the Hume Dam incident prompted a detailed risk analysis in 
Australia, which, by default, resulted in an unplanned dual 
experience base in Australia. 
This development was most unexpected although it was in fact 
a case of history repeating itself as ANCOLD’ and BC Hydro 
had, in 1994, come to coincident conclusions’concerning the 
general principles of risk assessment in dam safety practice. 
In adopting the dual strategy, BC Hydro had an unparalleled 
experience base to evaluate the success of its investigations. 
By 1998, BC Hydro carefully examined the success of the 
various initiatives and concluded that ‘simplified approaches’, 
while desirable in concept, were not achievable given the 
analytical techniques available. BC Hydro also concluded that 
detailed analytical estimates of risk could only be made under 
very special circumstances because, for the most part, the 
necessary analytical procedures were either overly crude or 
non-existent. In particular, BC Hydro concluded that 
fundamental philosophical and scientific problems with 
simplified de-compositional approaches to failure mechanism 
analysis and probability estimation using ‘Kent Charts’ 
rendered the approach unsuitable for decision-making 
concerning the safety of dams. In reality, BC Hydro had 
produced empirical evidence supporting the hypotheses of 
earlier years mentioned previously (Casagrande, Baecher et 
al., Whitman) that reliable quantification of risk would be 
difficult and beyond the capability of most engineers. Further, 
it was perfectly clear that Lambe’s observation that there was 
a need for Type A predictive models was correct. 
These were profound developments from an engineering 
perspective, because, in principle, Casagrande’s proposal, as 
developed by Whitman, was feasible provided Lambe’s Type 
A predictive models were available. Importantly these huge 
advances in engineering were accompanied by even greater 
changes in risk management in general. 
In 1997, BC Hydro concluded that the ‘engineering’ approach 
to risk assessment, i.e. estimate the risk and aompare against 
‘arbitrarily selected decision criteria’ for use in decision- 
making was fundamentally flawed. BC Hydro also recognised 
that risk analysis was of limited value if it wati not carried out 
within a risk management and risk control framework that is 
legally defensible and acceptable to knowledgeable regulators 
and the public. This led to the development of BC Hydro’s 
dam risk management system, the architec 
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e of which is 
gaining increasing acceptance in intemationa practice (Fig. 
I-6). 
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Fig. i-6. BC Hydro ‘s Dam Risk Management System 
By the end of 1998, BC Hydro’s position concerning the role 
of risk analysis in dam safety practice was distinctly different 
to contemporary trends, which continued to be based on 
simplified approaches. In some respects, we were mistakenly 
perceived as having unrealistically high standards employing 
‘impractical’ (from the perspective of lowest cost to the owner 
and ‘commodity’ engineering experience) analytical 
procedures. However, we remained undeterred as history 
(including our own extensive experience) indicated that 
quantitative risk analysis in dam safety practice was difficult 
and possibly even impossible for some cases, especially if not 
practised within a structured risk management procedure. 
THE EVE OF Y2K 
As Y2K approached, it became clear that society expected 
owners of ‘risky’ facilities to be much more accountable for 
the safety management of their operations. The end of the 
1990’s saw a paradigm shift in risk regulation with increased 
requirements for owners of hazardous facilities to obtain and 
maintain public trust. Decisions concerning risk to the public 
from engineered facilities no longer rest with owners and their 
engineers with the result that decision-making procedures 
concerning risk posed by dams would never be the same 
again. The most comprehensive treatment of the role of risk 
assessment in the management of catastrophic risks (e.g. dam 
failures) was produced by the UK Health and Safety Executive 
in 1999. 
On the eve of Y2K, all of the procedures and requirements for 
scientifically valid and legally defensible assessment of risk 
posed by dams were, in principle, in place. The analytical 
engineering procedures are outlined in Part II. 
Y2K AND BEYOND 
At the time of writing, Y2K is not over and, the outlook for 
risk analysis in geotechnical earthquake eng neering beyond 
Y2K is somewhat, but not completely, uncle k , as evidenced 
by Vol. I of the Proceedings of the 20” ICOLD Congress held 
in Beijing in September 2000. The ‘dual pathyi that emerged in 
Australia resulted in two apparently diame$ically opposite 
points of view. At one extreme there is the view that 
“methodologies for estimating the chance of dam failure are 
poorly developed and, at the present time, dp not provide a 
defensible basis for the conclusive sign offon the safety status 
of a dam” (McDonald et al., 2000). At the other extreme, 
there is the view that ‘methods are available for estimating 
the probabili@ offailure of dams for use in uantitative Risk 
Assessment for all failure modes” (Fell et al., 
Importantly, the conclusions reached by McDonald et al, who 
had explored the detailed analytical approach also coincided 
with those of BC Hydro. These observations are further 
investigated in Part II of this paper. 
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PART II 
QUANTIFICATION OF SEISMIC RISK FOR EARTH 
DAMS 
CASE STUDY 1 - HUGH KEENLEYSIDE DAM 
The purpose of presenting this section in this format of a 
“slide presentation” is to illustrate most effectively and 
concisely the essential features of one half of a detailed 
quantitative risk analysis, recognising that any detailed 
account would require an entire volume. This problem was 
well recognised by Tenaghi (Terzaghi, 1942) and, because 
scientifically-based quantitative risk analysis for dams 
requires an enormous amount of effort, it is not amenable to 
publication and peer review in the academic journals unless 
special arrangements can be made. To date, the necessary 
arrangements for publication of peer reviewed papers on 
quantitative risk analysis of a scientific nature in the 
established engineering and scientific literature has not 
occurred. 
A very abridged account of one part of the Hugh Keenleyside 
Dam quantitative risk analysis is described. The risk analysis 
has been restricted to: 
. 
0 one section of the earthfill dam system (the centre 
section), 
0 one hazard (seismic) and, 
0 one failure mode (seismically-induced liquefaction). 
0 
I have deliberately omitted one half of the risk analysis, the 
consequence analysis. 
The Hugh Keenleyside Dam (formerly Arrow Dam) is located 
on the Columbia River about 8 km upstream of Castlegar, 
British Columbia. The dam impounds the Arrow Lakes 
Reservoir, which has a storage volume of 8.8 x lo9 m3 and 
extends 233 km north to the city of Revelstoke. The regulation 
of this reservoir, under the terms of the Columbia River 
Treaty, provides both flood control and increased 
hydroelectric generation at plants located further downstream 
in the United States. There are currently no power generation 
facilities at this dam. 
The dam, which has a total length of 810 m, comprises a 58 m 
high concrete gravity structure, 360 m in length, a navigation 
lock, concrete bulkhead sections and a 52 m high earthfill dam 
450 m in length. The impervious barrier comprises an 
upstream till core connected to an impervious blanket that 
extends 670 m upstream. 
In 1990, BC Hydro’s seismic hazard studies indicated that 
updated seismic design parameters were significantly higher 
than those used for the original design of the project over 25 
years ago. Consequently, seismic stability studies of the 
concrete dam and earthfill dam were initiated in 1990 and 
1991 respectively. The seismic study of the earthfill dam was 
initiated to assess the liquefaction potential and seismic 
stability of the earthfill dam and foundation materials. 
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Screening level studies, which included field investigations 
and simplified analyses, indicated that extensive liquefaction 
could be triggered during the Maximum Design Earthquake 
(MDE) in the lower 20f m of the earthfill dam. Subsequently, 
additional field and laboratory investigations and more 
detailed analyses were carried out. 
Keenleyside Dam 
Middle Cross-section of the Eadhfill Dam 
0 
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@ BARGE DUNPED SAND AMD GRAVEL @ COUP- nU 
(3 COYPACTED SAWD AND DRAVEL cp WAVE AND SCDUR PRDTEcnDR 
(RIP RAP) 
Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analvsis 
A state-of-the-art probabilistic seismic hazard analysis 
(PSHA) was carried out by BC Hydro, which permitted 
probabilistic description of 
l Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA), 
l Peak Ground Velocity (PGV), 
l Spectral Acceleration (S,), 
l Magnitude, 
l Epicentral distance, and 
l Response spectrum. 
The enhanced PSHA considered both aleatory and epistemic 
uncertainties, with the “mean” seismic hazard expressed as 
annual exceedance frequency of the peak ground acceleration, 
together with confidence bands (expressed as f&tiles). 
Owing to the general lack of defined faults, the average 
potential hazard across the region was used as the basis for 
characterising the seismic hazard. The outputs of the PSHA 
were expressed in the various forms required for the dam 
response analysis. 
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Uniform Hazard Response Spectra 
Uyertainty in PGA Hazard 
0 20 40 60 80 
PGA (*/g) 
Magnitude-Distance De-Aggregation 
ConlrlbuUom to PGA Contrlbutlons to 1.58 Sa 
Typical seismic parameters required as input to assess the dam 
response were: 
. PGA and S, hazards, complete with mean values and the 
uncertainties, 
l De-aggregation of the seismic hazard by magnitude and 
distance, 
l Uniform hazard response spectra, and, 
0 Parameters for assisting in time history selection. 
Dam Response Analvsis 
The first stage of the dam response analysis involved a 
dynamic analysis of the main section of the earthfill dam. The 
inputs to the analysis comprised the outputs of the PSHA and 
the geotechnical parameters of the soil materials comprising 
the dam and the foundation as obtained from field and 
laboratory investigations.. Focus for the dam response 
analysis was obtained by first performing a simplified 
screening analysis using basic calculations and empirical 
ChiWtS. This was followed by detailed analysis generally 
involving dynamic response analyses using up to six 
earthquake records as inputs. The outputs of the PSHA were 
treated “deterministically” by selecting appropriate values of 
peak ground acceleration (PGA) and the currently accepted 
maximum magnitude of the design earthquake @IDE) (e.g. 
PGA with an annual exceedance frequency (AEF) of lo’, 
coupled with a magnitide of = 6.5). The matter of 
deterministic definition of the MDE on the basis of PSI-IA is 
controversial and is t3rther complicated by enormous 
inconsistencies between deterministic performance goals for 
earthquake and flood hazards. Treatment of the problem of 
seismic performance goals is beyond the scope of this lecture, 
but it is worth noting that these problems are restricted to 
deterministic performance goals, problems that are overcome 
in the risk assessment approach. Design spectrum were based 
on the 1991 work of Idriss, supplemented with the later update 
presented by Idriss (1998). 
Detailed original site investigation and construction records 
were available. In addition, the results of detailed 
investigations of the dam carried out in the 1990’s using state- 
of the-art investigative techniques were collected. Exploration 
methods included standard and cone penetration tests with 
appropriate consideration of the method of penetration and 
energy calibration. For the more gravelly soils, the Becker 
penetration test, with appropriate corrections, was used. The 
gravely nature of the soils, which were barge dumped through 
flowing water at the time of construction, posed significant 
challenges both for investigation and subsequent analysis. 
For the purpose of modelling liquefaction, it was assumed that 
the established model for seismically induced liquefaction of 
granular soils applied, although there was some uncertainty 
concerning the validity of this assumption. This assumption 
was subsequently investigated further. The fundamental 
features of ‘the model were: 
l When loose granular soil is subjected to vibration or 
cyclic shear loading, the soil skeleton tends to compact to 
a smaller volume. 
l If the soil is saturated and the water within the pore is 
prevented from draining, the load originally carried by the 
soil skeleton is gradually transferred from the 
intergranular stress to the pore water. 
l With the reduction in the intergranular stress, the stiffness 
and the shear strength of the soil become smaller and 
smaller. 
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. The consequence is that the deformation becomes larger 
and larger. When the strength becomes less than the 
static shear load, FLOW SLIDE becomes likely 
The Lower San Fernando Dam case history of seismically 
induced liquefaction and slumping provides empirical 
evidence supporting the modelling assumptions. Soil 
liquefaction triggering was based on the work of Seed et al. 
(1984-1985) 
Soil Liquefaction Triggering 
based on Field Performam% 
Relationship between stress 
ratios causing liquefaction 
and (N&-values for clean 
sands and silty sands for 
M = 7.5 Earthquakes 
(Afler Seed et al.. 1985) 
Typical Screening Analysis for Liquefaction 
Chart for Liquefaction Assessment is due to Seed et al (1987) 
CSRisCyclicStressRatio Oe / : ’ ’ 
CSR=0.65’F.A.rd 
YW 
yut is the saturated unit weight 
r, 
7. is the unit weight of water To, 
A is peak ground acceleration 
r, is a reduction factor dependent 
on the depth of soil element 
under consideration 
For the purposes of obtaining the cyclic stress ratio (CSR) 
from l-Dimensional (SHARE) (Schnabel et. al, 1972) and 2- 
Dimensional (FLUSH) (Lysmer et. al, 1975, 1979) time 
history dynamic response analyses, three to five earthquake 
records were selected for the deterministic analyses based on 
the peak ground acceleration, magnitude and the shape of the 
design spectrum. The calculated CSR was then used to 
determine the zones of liquefaction and high excess pore 
pressure. This provided the ability to determine the post 
earthquake stability using limit equilibrium analysis, or post 
earthquake deformation (crest slumping) using ftite element 
deformation analysis. 
The selected earthquake record, expressed in terms of 
acceleration time history, served as the input to the dynamic 
analysis (SHARE model), which utilised a non-linear strain 
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dependent stress-strain relationship. The dynamic response 
analysis involved an ‘equivalent linear analysis’ where, 
through iteration, the shear moduli in different layers were 
compatible with the average strains developed.: 
1 D Shake Analysis 
Middle Cross-section of the 
Earthfill Dam 
SHAKE COLUMNS 
1 FOUNDATlON SANDS AND GRAVELS 4 END DUMPED (PC(SHED) TILL 
2 BARGE DUMPED SAND AND GRAVEL 5 COMPACTED TILa 
3 COMPACTED SAND AND GRAVEL 6 WAVE AND SCOl$? PROTECTION 
(RIP R4F’) 
Selection of Acceleration Time HisFories 
Selected PGA was 0.22 g, M8.5 
The output of the SHAKE analysis for the two representative 
columns provided the calculated variation of CSR with depth 
at the specified locations. Zones of liquefaction were defined 
in terms of Factor of Safety against Liquefaction 
Liquefaction Analysis using SHAKE Results 
BELOW Cyclic Slrers RaUo 
CREST 0 cl2 04 08 
Cyclic f3ttx.q Ratio 
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Determination of Zones of Liquefaction 
Define Factor of Safety against Liquefacton : 
-~,a = CRR (Liquefaction Resis tat-m) CSR (Cyclic Stress Ratio) 
Liauefaction Zones - 
Liquefied (Residual Strength) %o < 1.0 
High Pore Pressure 1.0 cFS,,~ < 1.3 
Low Pore Pressure 1.3 < FS,,o c 2.0 
No Pore Pressure 2.0 c FS,,, 
The more refined 2-dimensional finite element FLUSH 
analysis also utihsed the kequency domain analysis method, a 
non-linear strain dependent stress-strain relationship, and the 
‘equivalent linear analysis’ technique. 
Dynamic Analysis using FLUSH 
FINITE ELEMENT MESH -FLUSH ANALYSIS 
Extent of the mesh = 600 m Number of Elements = 625 
Height of the mesh = 105 m Number of Nodes = 666 
< 
0.20 G (RIGID BASE) 
Liquefaction Analysis using FLUSH 
LIQUEFACTION FACTOR OF SAFETY 
While selection of the post-liquefaction value of the residual 
strength is vitally important because of its influence on the 
post-liquefaction stability of the dam, there is no 
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straightforward means of estimating what the probability 
distribution of the residual strength might be. Laboratory 
measurements, based on post-cyclic monotonic loading is not 
particularly satisfactory as the results are ‘point data’ that tend 
to be on the high side. Empirical data can bemused as a basis, 
but this too is not particularly satisfactory owing to differences 
between existing empirical relationships. The issue is further 
complicated by the fact that the material in the dam and 
foundation is gravelly. 
Undrained Residual Strength, S, 
Stability Analysis using Residual Strength 
Calculating Sliding Factor of Safety 
for the Post Earthquake Condition 
Reslduai Strength High Pore Pressure 
0 20 40 acl METER SCALE - 
Finite Element Deformation Analysis - SOILSTRESS 
* SOILSTRESS and Hyperbolic Stress-Strain Relationship. 
* Post Liquefaction Stiffhess is governed by the residual strength, 
s,. and the liquefaction strain, ylm. 
Stress stress 
Y Strain Y Ylim Strain 
Pre-Liquefaction Post-Liquefaction 
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Finite Element Deformation Analysis - Results 
Keenleyslda EarlMII Dam - Middle Cross-section 
The phased approach to the dam response analysis, beginning 
with screening analyses and culminating in detailed finite 
element deformation analysis, proved to be very successful. 
However, it is important to recognise that there are enormous 
differences in time and resource requirements between these 
two approaches. 
Procedure For Calculating The Probabilitv Of Failure 
The procedure for calculating the probability of failure of the 
dam recognised the uncertainties in the deterministic analyses 
of the dynamic response as described in the previous section. 
While the procedure described here is restricted to the seismic 
hazard and the associated performance of the dam, this 
account is structured to illustrate how the geotechnical 
earthquake engineering component of the analysis was 
interfaced with the dam breach and failure consequences 
analyses. The essential features of dam failure mechanism 
were modelled in event tree format where the term ‘event tree’ 
is used in its most general form. 
Event Tree - Life Safety 
For instance, the distribution of in-situ soil strength 
(i.e. N-value) is a pre-earthquake state of nature and not an 
‘event’ per se, as is the reservoir level at the time of the 
earthquake. 
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(N,)60 distribution 
WEIGHTS FOR (N& 
l These are subject& estimates and 
the values were selected based on 
the results of field !investigaion and 
other geotechnicaj data. 
- The N values shown on the chart al 
the nominal value’ , e.g. N=10 refer 
to 10 blows for do stream berm, 
11 blows for mid- ” lope and 12 blow 
for the material below the crest. 
Reservoir Level Weights 
WEIGHTS FOR RESERVOIR WATER LEVEL 
- These probabilities are based on the 
historical record of the water levels. 
l It is judged that when the water level 
is below EL 430.0. the consequence 
of overtopping given failure is 
negligible. 
440 435 430 
RSVR. WATER LEVEL 
The seismic hazard was introduced at the third and fourth 
nodes in the tree 
Probabilities - Ground acceleration 
Spectral Act. (%g) 
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Two-dimensional analysis was carried out using two 
earthquake records to obtain the acceleration response. While 
spectral acceleration (S,) were used in the analysis, the 
associated PGA values were used for labelling the amplitude 
of the earthquake in the analysis for convenience. 
Conditional Probabilities - Acceleration Response 
FOURIER AMPLIFICATION FUNCTION 
2D Analysis using 2 EQ Records 
Typical Point within the Dumped Sand and Gravel 
-snu wu)RD. pwio.leG GILmY “1 EECORD F54=a 2BG 
Selected 6 Acceleration intervals, 
the probabilities are based on S, 
Natural Scale Logarithmic Scale 
.- 
0  5 10 15 
S, (al.5 set) in ?kg 
The seismic hazard was characterised by six acceleration 
levels, and for each acceleration level, the contributions Tom 
different earthquakes were de-aggregated into six magnitude 
intervals, leading to thirty-six PGA - Magnitude pair 
combinations for input into the subsequent liquefaction 
analysis. 
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Magnitude Contributions 
Time histories were scaled to the selected PGA; however, the 
appropriate uniform hazard response spectrum, matched at the 
1.5-second spectral ordinate, was used to derive the 
probabilities. 
Acceleration Time Histories 
Scaling Factors and Probability 
Probability of Liquefaction - Deterministic Triggering 
The determination of the 
Probability of Liquefaction, 
P L,o, given the value of CSR is 
based on the data compiled by 
Liao. Veneziano and Whitman, 
1988: I 
pllc, = A 1+-e-” 
g=Bi+P2xln(CSRN)~P3x((N,),,) 
10 m 30 40 
cN1)60 
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Probability of Liquefaction 
SPT W,), 
[ (Ah Liao, Vmziano and Witman, 1988) 1 
Rather than using a single value of probability of liquefaction 
(PLIQ) to determine the liquefaction resistance (CRR), three 
different values were used. That is, for a given (N,)bo value, 
there are three different CRR values, corresponding to 
different confidence levels, that are used to determine the 
liquefaction zone. For instance, for the case of 
(Nl)60= 10 blows& CRR values of 0.11, 0.14 and 0.18 
correspond to 15%, 50% and 85% probability. These three 
values of probability of liquefaction, together with the thirty 
six PGA-Magnitude pairs (6 sets of CSR’s x 6 magnitude 
correction factor intervals and 3 associated values of PLIo) 
resulted in a total of 108 liquefaction cases to be considered. 
In other words, there were 108 end branches at the 
liquefaction node of the event tree. To make the analysis 
tractable, the 108 liquefaction states were reduced to six 
representative “liquefaction states”. 
Realization of Liquefaction Resistance from P,,, 
IO 
CSR 
Conditional Probabilities of the Liquefaction Maps 
ZONES OF LIQUEFACTION FOR DIFFERENT P-L@. 
P,,, =0.85 PLY)> =0.50 P La3 =0.15 
REPRESENTATIVE 
PROBABILITY 
+obabilistic Description of Liquefaction Zones 
Representative Liquefaction Zone Maps 
The next stage of the analysis was to determine the probability 
distribution of crest slumping given the liquefied state (as 
described by one of the representative maps),. The range of 
crest slumping was divided into increments; Om, O.lm, OSm, 
lSm, 3m, 5 m and >5m. The steps in the process were as 
follows: 
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1. Using the ‘gravity turn-on’ finite element method, the 
magnitude of crest slumping (Dcr) for a given 
liquefaction map was calculated, with an appropriate 
range of values for the strength and stress-strain 
parameters, s, and Ylim selected to reflect the uncertainty of 
these parameters in the probabilistic analysis. 
2. Using a subjective transformation of the computed crest 
slumping to predicted actual crest slumping, the 
conditional probability of the crest slumping falling 
within one of the intervals mentioned above was 
estimated. 
3. Steps 1 and 2 were repeated for each combination of s, 
ad Ylirn. 
4. Step 3 was repeated for each liquefaction zone map. 
5 Sr Values with Different Probabilities 
p/pa 
Reference Sr at p/pa 





Subjective Probability Distribution for Sr Values 
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 
Reference Sr (PSF) 
Subjective Probability Distribution for Ylim 
Probability Values for ylim 
I I 
I Finite Element Deformation Analysis 
Residual Strength 
Probablllty Dlsbibutlon 
SOILSTRESS and Hyperbolic Stress- 
Strain Relationship. 
Post Liquefaction Stiffness is 
governed by the residual strength, s,, 
and the liquefaction straln, y,,,. 
I I 
I I 
I Computed Crest Settlements I 
Conditional Probabilities of Crest Slumping 
THE PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE 
ACTUAL TO COMPUTED CREST SLUMPING 
Finally, damage states for the range of original reservoir levels 
were defined to link the dam breach with the inundation 
consequences component of the analysis (not described here). 
The damage states ranged from ‘No Damage’ through ‘Rapid 
Release’. 
Defining Damage States for Different Water Levels 
1 Definition 1 
Probability of Damage 
for different states. 




- Rpd Rel. IS Rapid Rele 
and Dly Rel. is Delayed 
Release of Reservoir 
* Water Level is 440 M 
Here ends the geotechnical earthquake-engineering component 
of the Keenleyside Dam Risk Analysis. The consequences of 
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failure analyses being the ‘other side’ or the risk equation is 
not presented in this paper. Both components, however, are 
required to advance from the engineering analysis to the wider 
policy/societal risk evaluation and assessment processes. 
The analysis of the probability of failure of the Keenleyside 
Earthtill Dam due to seismically induced liquefaction has been 
subjected to extensive independent peer review by recognised 
experts in all of the required engineering disciplines. This 
peer review is necessary to establish the validity of the 
analytical procedure used to compute the probability of 
failure. Here it is important to note that, even this extensive 
analytical estimate of the risk is incomplete as a formal 
analysis of the uncertainties in the estimate of risk has yet to 
be carried out. However, the procedures to perform this 
uncertainty analysis are known and are essentially of the form 
used in the probabilistic seismic hazard analysis. However, 
this does not detract from the analysis that has been completed 
thus far, as it was sufficiently complete to permit BC Hydro to 
advance to the next stage of the dam safety decision-making 
process. 
The entire analysis and assessment process is presently being 
documented. Therefore, it would be inappropriate for anyone 
to reach any conclusions concerning the underlying 
philosophy, the level of effort and resource requirements and 
the status of the analytical procedures for use in dam safety 
practice in general. This said, the geotechnical earthquake- 
engineering component of the analysis used to estimate the 
probability of failure, with the exception of the uncertainty 
analysis, has become established as a scientifically valid 
engineering procedure through the recognised professional 
and learned procedures. 
Professor A. Casagrande, who introduced the concept of risk 
analysis for dams, was the consultant for the original design of 
Keenleyside Dam. Professor R.V. Whitman, who extended 
the work of Professor Casagrande and developed the 
procedure for analysing the probability of failure, provided 
participatory peer review for the Keenleyside Dam Risk 
analysis, along with Professor C.A. Cornell and Professor 
N.C. Lind. Professor P.M. Byrne, Dr. W. F. Marcusson III and 
Professor R.B. Seed provided subject matter expertise in the 
various aspects of the analysis of the performance of the dam. 
Together with the BC Hydro team members, Casagrande’s 
vision of the future was successfully created, for one of his 
own designs. This ‘giant step’ forward was made during the 
Watershed Years from 1995 to 1998, and it provides a basis 
for further advances in risk analysis for dams, especially in the 
field of geotechnical earthquake engineering. 
RECENT DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES IN DETAILED 
QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS 
A review of the literature quickly reveals that, for the most 
part approaches to risk analysis range from applications which 
involve little de-composition and rely extensively on 
‘judgmental’ probabilities. The ‘watershed period’ represents 
an important stage in the development of risk analysis in dam 
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safety practice. It can be traced back to the first serious 
attempts to use risk analysis to decide ifa dam is safe enough 
when the issues of scientific validity and legal defensibility 
came to the fore in international practice. The following two 
examples presented in this paper, the Hume Dam case study 
and the second a procedure proposed by Lin and Hung (Lin 
and Hung, 1999) for non-liquefaction seismic risk analysis, 
serve to illustrate the form and status of ‘post watershed’ risk 
analysis for dams. 
Professor H.B. Seed observed that embankment dams may fail 
because of excessive settlement and deformation, or due to a 
significant build-up of pore water pressure, or as a result of 
sliding of embankment slopes (Seed, 1979). This raised the 
question as to whether or not the ‘settlement’ and 
‘deformation’, and/or the embankment slope sliding failure 
modes could be. Information on the seismic component of the 
Hume Dam risk analysis, which focuses on liquefaction, is 
presented to illustrate some of the many issues that must be 
considered by the analysis team. The dam response analysis 
procedure is not presented, but was similar to an earlier, but 
unsatisfactory iteration of the Keenleyside risk analysis. The 
work of Lin and Hung, (Lin et al. 1999) suggests that, in 
principle, it might be possible, to assess the risk for 
embankment slope sliding at any rate. Interestingly, the 
groundwork for this analysis was developed in the 1980’s and 
involved some of those working in this field at that time. 
There are significant parallels between the proposal of Lin and 
Hung and the Keenleyside Dam risk analysis. This is due in 
part because they both rely on the pioneering work carried out 
at MIT during the 1980’s. 
The question of ‘equivalence’ of methods and decisions made 
on the basis of the risk analyses that present different various 
level of analytical detail (essentially none through to 
mathematically and scientifically rigorous) is one of the most 
difficult questions requiring resolution at this time. 
HUME DAM RISK ANALYSIS - SEISMIC RISK 
COMPONENT FOR THE EARTH DAM 
The Hume Dam risk analysis represents one of the most 
ambitious attempts to perform a comprehensive risk analysis 
of a large dam comprising earth and concrete structures for all 
failure modes. The sheer breadth and complexity of the 
problem to be analysed are such that an in-depth analysis of 
the risk could not be carried out. This brief summary, based 
on McDonald and Wan, 1998 and McDonald, Cooper and 
Wan, 2000 (which in no way could ever reflect the enormous 
amount of work involved) outlines some of the complexities in 
the analytical procedures that should be accounted for in a 
seismic risk analysis. The Hume Dam risk analysis does not 
constitute an alternative to the Keenleyside Dam risk analysis 
as it does not include the vitally important deformation 
analysis, and it includes procedures subsequently found to be 
unsuitable to the task of quantifying risk. However, it is 
worthy of recognition because it led to the conclusion 
concerning inadequacy of analytical procedures for ‘signing 
off on the safety status of dams. 
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From the perspective of geotechnical earthquake engineering, 
the study represents a significant advance in Australian 
practice as it was the first time that the effects of earthquake 
magnitude were considered in a risk analysis in that country 
(McDonald and Wan, 1998). The account does refer to 
protocols for assigning probabilities (these are not presented 
here) but the validity (in an absolute sense) remains to be 
demonstrated. This is an issue for debate in the profession, 
something which has not received adequate attention thus far. 
The approach used at Hume Dam included consideration of 
five dams, three training walls and a system of 29 spillway 
gates, 
8 1 failure modes, 
up to 32 branches in event trees, 
8 flood loading states, 
48 earthquake loading scenarios, and 
6 prior storage levels. 
This resulted in a requirement to assign and keep track of 
some 15,000 conditional probabilities. It was felt that without 
a systematic approach, analysts and reviewers could become 
confused in attempting to assess such a large number of 
figures. It was also recognised that there was a need to 
maintain logical consistency throughout the analysis. Double 
counting also had to be avoided. It was considered that the 
most practical approach for handling the large number of 
probabilities was to enter them onto spreadsheets, and to use 
the event trees simply to illustrate the logic of the failure 
process. Whilst the spreadsheets reduce the computation load 
and avoid arithmetic errors, there was no practical way of 
assessing logical consistency and checking against double 
counting. The solution that was adopted for the Hume study 
was the concept of the “Probability Assignment Protocol”. 
This was a concise instruction for assigning probabilities as a 
hmction of loading condition. 
The obvious requirement to write down the reasons for 
assigning probabilities (see BC Hydro, 1993) was found by 
the analysis team to clarify their thinking and was extremely 
beneficial to the analysis. It also provided a permanent record 
of the rationale, which allows those not associated with the 
study to understand the basis for the probability values. The 
analysis team went as far as to recommend “that such 
documentation should be regarded as mandatory for a risk 
assessment study”. The analysis team also felt that 
documentation of sound reasoning would be an aid to legal 
defensibility, especially where review panels might pass 
judgement on the reasoning. 
Seismic response considerations and analysis method 
The procedure of Liao and Whitman was followed for the 
Hume risk assessment study. The Hume embankments were 
not susceptible to liquefaction but the alluvial soils of the 
foundation were. However, spatial considerations were 
considered to be important, as the analysis was based on 
information gained horn drill holes that had been put down at 
various sections along the length of the embankments. This 
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issue poses several interesting philosophical questions about 
the meaning of ‘probability of failure’ for long linear 
structures. While these issues remain to be resolved, the 
account of how it was examined in the Hume Dam risk 
analysis is summarised here because it illustrates a way of 
thinking, and it was the fust time that the matter had been 
addressed in contemporary practice. The matter was 
considered during the Keenleyside Dam analysis, but not 
followed through for various reasons (Keenleyside Dam is not 
as long, and there are other unique features that made it 
appropriate to consider the dam in sections). 
At regular depth intervals, SPT values had been obtained and 
samples had been recovered for particle size analysis. A 
spreadsheet was prepared, with fields for information such as 
location, borehole number, depth, soil type (percent fines), 
groundwater level and N value from the CPT and SPT tests. 
Each row represented one test level in one borehole. There 
was an entry for every test location over all of the 
embankments. On another spreadsheet, every row of the test 
data spreadsheet was run through the Liao et al regression 
equations to find the probability of liquefaction for that test 
location. It was observed that the Liao et al. equations 
yielded a probability of liquefaction for low magnitude events. 
However, it was felt that, in reality, such events would not 
cause liquefaction because the duration of shaking would be 
too short and the number of stress reversals too few. It was 
decided that this problem would be handled by setting the 
probability of liquefaction to ‘zero’ for event magnitudes of 
MS.0 or less. This initial stage was consistent with the 
magnitude ‘cut-off approach followed for Keenleyside Dam. 
The highest probability of liquefaction in a borehole was taken 
as the representative probability for that location. At sections 
where there were three boreholes, some interesting questions 
arose: 
1. What is the probability that liquefaction will occur at all 
three boreholes; that is, over a sufficiently large area that 
a large scale slide could occur? 
2. Would liquefaction at only one borehole location give rise 
to a threat to the dam? 
3. What is the probability that the boreholes have found the 
zone that is most susceptible to liquefaction? 
Concerning question 1, it is reported that after considerable 
reflection, it was concluded that the first question should be 
addressed using the uni-modal bounds theorem described as 
follows: The upper bound probability of liquefaction 
occurring over the whole area is the lowest of the three 
representative probabilities for each location, whereas the 
lower bound probability would be the intersection of the 
liquefaction events at each location. The lower bound would 
be the product of the three representative probabilities and was 
generally considered to be a vanishingly small value. The 
next problem encountered when addressing this question 
related to embankment length issues and concerned the fact 
that the more boreholes that are available, the lower the lower 
bound probability. The only possible conclusion is that the 
probability of liquefaction at a borehole is a function of the 
area represented by the borehole such that the lower bound 
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probability becomes independent of the number of boreholes. 
This thought process gave rise to a related question: “What is 
the area to which the Liao et al probabilities apply?” The 
complexity of these issues was clearly recognised by the 
analysis team, and they deserve credit for putting their 
approach forward for debate. For reasons of practicality, the 
analysis team, in a refreshingly open comment remarked: 
“‘For the Hume study, the simple approach (or perhaps the 
easy way out) was taken by considering only the upper 
bound. ” 
Concerning the second question, the analysis team had the 
following thoughts: ‘At some sections, the highest 
representative probability was sometimes a couple of orders 
higher than the others. The answer to the question seemed to 
relate to the location of the high probability borehole. If it was 
under the downstream toe of the dam, it seemed quite 
plausible that Iocalised liquefaction in that area could cause a 
small-scale slide, which might still endanger the dam. If the 
highest probability borehole was well upstream, toward the 
dam crest, it seemed less likely that a slide would result from 
local liquefaction in that area, although there obviously would 
be some impact on the post-liquefaction Factor of Safe&, F. A 
search process was undertaken to see what situations gave the 
highest value for the product, probability of liquefaction times 
probability of a post-liquefaction slide times probability of 
dam failure, given the slide. In the case of Hume Dam, the 
result was that liquefaction over the whole area represented 
by the three boreholes was always the critical case. ” 
Moving on to the third principal question above, which arose 
from consideration of the previous two, it became clear that 
the boreholes represent only a small sample from very large 
areas that could be susceptible to liquefaction. For example, at 
Hume Bank No. 1, there was an area some 600m long by 
120m wide where liquefaction is an issue. Sixteen boreholes 
had been sunk over the area in question. The analysis team 
reasoned that it seemed plausible that there would be areas 
with a higher probability of liquefaction than any of those 
examined. They also observed that strength may drop to a 
value below the static value but higher than residual undrained 
strength, either because drainage relieves pore pressure during 
shaking, or because too few cycles of shaking result in only a 
partial increase in pore pressure. 
It was reported that the probability that the residual undrained 
strength would be reached, given liquefaction, was not an 
issue for Hume Dam, because the investigations revealed that 
all of the liquefiable zones were capped by finer, relatively 
impermeable sediments. The analysis team reasoned that there 
would be no opportunity for drainage to relieve excess pore 
pressures generated during, and immediately after, earthquake 
shaking. The analysts also reasoned that the conditional 
probability of reaching residual undrained strength, given 
liquefaction, was 1.0. This said, the analysts recognised that 
this will not always be the case. Making use of the work of 
Stark and Mesri as a basis for reasoning, they considered that 
the real issue that they were dealing with was the lowest 
strength reached, and the impact that that would have on the 
probability of sliding. It was considered that, where drainage 
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would occur, the lowest strength may be a value somewhere 
between the static pre-earthquake strength and the residual 
undrained strength. It was noted that no probabilistic treatment 
of this issue could be found in the literature, but it was felt that 
it could be a real issue in many cases. 
It was felt that there was more than one reason that the lowest 
strength reached during liquefaction could be intermediate 
between the static value and the residual undrained value. One 
was that there might only be a partial increase in pore pressure 
because of insufficient duration of shaking (the consideration 
of magnitude described in the Keenleyside Dam risk analysis 
is included to address this issue). The analysts also expressed 
the view that considering the post earthquake strength to be 
either the static strength or the undrained residual strength is 
simplistic and unrealistic. The analysts felt that these 
considerations point to the need for a comprehensive 
probabilistic treatment of strength reduction due to pore 
pressure increase during earthquake shaking. 
Because of the dramatic reduction in Factor of Safety, F, that 
occurs it was felt reasonable to characterise the probability of 
failure in terms of a liquefaction induced slope failure. For the 
Hume study, the residual undrained strength was expressed as 
an equivalent friction angle. This value varied between 4 and 9 
degrees typically, based on the strength versus N value 
relationship given by Stark and Mesri. The typical static F 
values of 1.5 to 1.7 dropped to post-liquefaction values of 0.8 
to 1.0. Reliability analysis, with standard deviation in F 
estimated by FOSM, was used to produce similar system 
response curves to those shown in Fig. II-l. In this case, the 
liquefied horizontal foundation zones accounted for 84% of 
the variance in F. The conditional probabilities of a slide, 
given liquefaction, were typically high (0.02 to 0.9) because of 
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Fig. II-I. Prospective Probability of Sliding for Hume Dam 
Embankments 
SEISMICALLY INDUCED SLIDING FAILURE OF 
EMBANKMENT DAMS (From Lin and Hung, 1999) 
The following is a summary of a more detailed treatment 
provided by Dr. J-S Lin. The approach builds on Newmark’s 
investigations (Newmark, 1965) which had shown that the 
factor of safety of slopes of embankment dams drops 
temporarily below one during earthquakes but, this does not 
necessarily represent ‘failure’. As an earthquake shaking 
reverses its direction, a sliding instability may come to a stop. 
However, during a strong earthquake, a slope may undergo 
many slide-stop cycles and cumulates movements in a step- 
wise fashion. Newmark concluded that it is the total 
accumulation of movement that determines the stability of a 
slope, not the factor of safety per se. 
The approach begins with the concept of a ‘critical 
acceleration, where a slope sliding is initiated if the ground 
acceleration exceeds a critical acceleration, &. A, is defined 
as the acceleration that reduces the slope factor of safety to 
one by introducing an adverse inertia force. A, is obtained 
through static slope stability analysis. 
A /S-l 
c 3.33 g 
The mean and coefftcient of variation were determined using 
conventional probabilistic techniques. 
Other assumptions for the example were that: 
. The most critical slope was one extending 6om crest to 
mid-height; and 
. The mean, E[FS], and coefftcient of variation, 
C.O.V.[FS], of the factor of safety FS, were 1.5 and 0.2 
respectively. 
The resulting mean, E[&] and coefficient of variation 
C.O.V.[&], of the critical acceleration, were 0.4 and O.lSg 
respectively. Using a lognormal distribution, and simplifying 
the distribution into four discrete points, the derived 
distribution of A, was as shown in Table II-l. 
pJ=pq 
Table II-I Derived distribution of Critical Acceleration A, 
Failure Criteria 
Analogous to the Keenleyside Dam Analysis, it was necessary 
for Lin and Hung to introduce a failure criterion, and a similar 
approach was adopted (based on suggestions by Legg et al 
(1982) for seismic slope stability evaluation). In this study, 
the risk associated with slope movement ‘D’ of D 220 cm, 
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D 2 50 cm, D 2 1 OOcm, D 2 1 SOcm, D 2 200cm and D 2 300 
cm are to be obtained. 
Procedure 
The basic Newmark procedure of 
1. Identifying the sliding surface that has the smallest factor 
of safety through conventional slope stability analysis; 
2. Conducting nonlinear dynamic analysis of the earth dams 
to obtain average response acceleration of the mass above 
the critical sliding surface; 
3. Using the average absolute response acceleration and the 
critical acceleration, to calculate the slope movement, was 
employed. 
Nonlinear dynamic analysis of earth dams was carried out 
using simple equivalent linear finite element programs, such 
as QUAD-4 developed by Idriss et al, 1973. For this 
particular application, simple shear wedge models were found 
to provide results compatible to those obtained from finite 
elements. The simple shear wedge model employed modal 
superposition in the dynamic analysis. 
Considering a dam of 115 m high with an average shear wave 
velocity of 300 m/s, the average absolute response of the mass 
above a potential sliding surface extending from crest to mid- 
height of the dam is computed. A sample calculation showing 
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Fig. II-2 Evolution of slope movement under Earthquake 
excitation 
Treatment of the uncertainty in the dynamic properties of the 
dam was not included in the study, but the authors’ noted that, 
Paper No. SOAP - 5 
in practice, this component of uncertainty can be accounted 
for if adequate data were available. 
To obtain the distribution of slope movement, P(D), Lin and 
Hung propose that first estimates of the conditional 
distribution P(DIPGA, M, 4) could be made by employing a 
probabilistic sliding block model as in Lin and Whitman 
(1984). This study also employed an ensemble of 30 rock site 
records from the 1971 San Fernando earthquake. This 
ensemble was considered a representative sampling of rock 
site motions. Its average response spectrum compares well 
with that derived by Seed et al. These records are further 
scaled to various magnitudes using the process proposed by 
Lin and Tyan (1986). 
1. Under a set of 4, PGA and M, conditional mean and 
variance of D were computed for 30 records. 
2. Assuming the conditional distribution of D to be 
lognormal, P(D>dojPGA,M,&,yr) for various do were 
computed. 
3. P(D>doJM, yr) was obtained by summing over the possible 
variation of 4 and PGA at a given earthquake magnitude, i.e., 
4. The total risk ,P(D>dolyr), was obtained by summing 
contributions from all magnitudes, 
P(D > do 1 yr) = cP(D > do 1 M,yr)P(M) 
In the probabilistic sliding block model, slope movement is 
expressed as a ftmction of 4, the duration of ground motion, 
S, together with some response statistics. Specifically, the 
statistics used are the root-mean-square, 0 , a bandwidth 
measure, 6 , and the central frequency, fi, 6om the response 
spectral density function. The lognormal distribution was 
found to describe this conditional distribution well. The two 
parameters of the model, the conditional mean, 
E[D 1 PGA, A, ,G, a,6 ) and the coefficient of variation, 
CO V[ D 1 PGA, A,, 0 , Sz, 6 ) , were also computed. 







v: = +(-$ 
f(S)=1+7.11(6 -0.2)* 0.2 16 IO.8 
29 
‘25r r CO.1 
2.5 + 0.723 ln(lOr) 0.1 I r I 0.2 
g(r) = < 3 0.2 I r < 0.5 
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To make use of Lin and Whitman’s model, the dynamic 
analysis of the dam was carried out in frequency domain, and 
spectral density functions of the average response 
accelerations are computed. Following the procedure outlined 
above, the risk of slope movement exceeding various 
thresholds are computed. 
The final result reflecting the risk of various levels of damages 
are as follows: 
Table II-2 Results of the analysis 
This final result can now be incorporated into an overall dam 
risk assessment. 
SIMPLIFIED APPROACHES 
Simplified approaches to risk analysis of dams, such as the 
risk-based decision methodology described previously in Part 
I, model risk in a very coarse manner as illustrated in Fig. 11-3. 
“’ 
Fig. 11-3. Simplified (coarse) ‘judgmental ’ risk analysis model 
This ‘judgmental’ approach, which is essentially that 
developed for the USBR’s risk-based decision analysis 
methodology has value if the results are used in a relative 
sense to prioritise dam safety improvements and to plan 
investigations (SMEC, 1995, Watson et al., 1997). 
Certainly, the simplified approach appears to have several 
attractive attributes if speed, cost and simplicity are the 
driving principles of the analysis. Unfortunately, these 
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attributes have associated drawbacks as in the absence of a 
mathematical structure anyone can say anything. There is 
always the danger of the dubious notions that a probability is 
what you believe it to be and everyone s probabilities are right 
even if they are different, being invoked as the approach can 
be applied quickly, cheaply and easily by anyone. Of course, 
a defender of the method might argue that only those with 
special qualities and experience in risk assessment for dams 
can make these judgements. 
Unfortunately, this ‘simplified’ and apparently ‘practical 
approach’ is not as straightforward or practical as it appears, if 
one abides by the rules of the exercise of judgement in 
engineering and the principles of estimating probabilities. 
One has to look no further than the Challenger Space Shuttle 
accident to question the validity of engineer’s judgements of 
probability and see how tragic the consequences should the 
advice lead to a bad decision. ‘Judgmental probabilities’ are 
more correctly termed ‘subjective probabilities ‘, where the 
theory of subjective probability forms an entire branch of the 
mathematics of probability. 
It is erroneous to give any credence to the numbers or to 
assume that the rank order is in some way mathematically or 
scientifically valid. The vigorous debate concerning the 
validity of this approach and the meaning of the numbers 
generated, which originated when the notion of ‘judgmental 
probabilities’ first emerged in the early 1980’s, has intensified 
in recent years. Recently, the debate has become more 
complex and divisive with analytical approaches to estimating 
risk being deemed by some to be ‘not practical’ or ‘too 
expensive ’ for all but the wealthiest of owners. The idea of 
risk analysis being ‘credible ‘, ‘defensible ’ and ‘transparent ’ 
has been attacked by some practitioners, and the idea of risk 
analysis being carried out in terms of certain standards and 
norms denounced. 
Objective (empirical frequency) probabilities and subjective 
probabilities, are not the same types of probability. The 
simplest way of obtaining objective probabilities is to perform 
repeated trials whereas the simplest method of obtaining a 
subjective probability is to simply ask the person what their 
‘degree of belief is. After all “a subjective probability is ‘just 
someone’s opinion ” (Cooke, 199 1). However, Cooke pointed 
out while this might be the simplest way of obtaining a 
subjective probability, it is equally surely the worst. The 
challenge was, and still is, to ensure that the probabilistic 
statement of opinion is well founded. The apparently practical 
‘empirical/judgmental ’ approach to probability estimation was 
clearly some kind of hybrid of two different concepts! 
Fundamentally, quantitative risk assessment of the form that 
was proposed requires an objective statement of the 
probability of failure of individual dams for comparison with 
‘objective’ criteria. The empirical record, which characterises 
the properties of the population of dams can never be 
indicative of the probability of failure of individual dams 
(statistics don’t apply to individuals). Also, ‘judgmental 
probabilities ’ are ‘subjective’- they have no objective meaning 
and only exist in the mind of the person making the estimate. 
The hybrid as applied to individual dams cannot have an 
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objective meaning as it is made up of two parts, neither of 
which exist in the real world. 
For subjective probabilities to be well founded, it is important 
that those making the estimates have substantive (subject 
matter) expertise and normative expertise (be well calibrated) 
(Morgan and Hemion, 1990). They had to have basic training 
in probabilistic reasoning (a notoriously difftcult discipline) 
and to be familiar with the mathematics of probability. They 
had to know how to transform evidence and experience into 
coherent statements of probability. Finally, because of the 
extent to which judgement pervades dam engineering, they 
also had to be people of judgement. 
If anything, given the extensive role of judgement in 
engineering practice, the ‘judgmental’ quality should have 
been the most readily available. Di Biagio and Hseg (1989) 
provide a very eloquent account of where judgement comes 
f?om, and this advice, together with the experience in 
estimating subjective probabilities outlined above, provided an 
insight into the make-up of project teams assigning 
judgmentalprobabilities ’ of dam responses. Ideally, the team 
should consist of 
. People of judgement; 
. People with theoretical knowledge, experimental 
evidence, empirical experience and the ability to 
integrate all elements of the exercise in a logical and 
transparent manner. 
l Individuals with substantive expertise; 
l Subject matter experts in each of the physical 
processes involved in the failure mechanism. 
. Who also have normative expertise; and 
. Are demonstrably well calibrated (have a good track 
record in ‘guessing right’), 
l All team members are trained in probabilistic reasoning; 
and 
l Have detailed knowledge of the dam under investigation, 
its properties, its design and performance and its 
vulnerabilities. 
Clearly, there is an enormous difference between asking 
someone to quantify their ‘opinion’ concerning the outcome of 
an event concerning a dam and asking properly qualified 
people of judgement (in the accepted engineering sense) to 
transparently transform their knowledge, experience and 
evidence into their ‘subjective probability’ of ‘the event’. 
Obviously, this is not routine engineering and certainly not 
‘commodity’ engineering. 
The difficulties of making ‘judgements’ of probability (as 
opposed to asking someone’s opinion) are manifestly obvious. 
Such judgements of probability are very uncertain because the 
data are scarce and difficult to relate to the case at hand (all 
dams are unique). Moreover, it is debatable whether it is 
really judgement that was being exercised, because those who 
were making these estimates lacked a rational mechanical 
model on which to base their beliefs. The dam safety analyst 
must “estimate,” i.e. assign, probabilities subjectively in part, 
often describing them as “engineering judgements” of 
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probabilities. Such guesses are used in lieu of probabilistic 
estimates of ‘parameters’ and ‘states’ made by means of 
observations and rational physical models. These guesses 
contaminate risk analyses, degrading quality. In the absence 
of realistic theories and mathematical structure, anyone could 
say anything, and in accordance with some interpretations of 
the theory of subjective probability, they would all be ‘right’! 
The practicality of making judgements of probability 
concerning the failure of dams clearly poses an enormous 
challenge. Setting aside any complexities associated with the 
mathematics, as they are numerous but essentially tractable if 
appropriate expertise is brought to bear on the problem, the 
most significant practical difftculties were found to be with the 
exercise of judgement concerning the behaviour of dams at or 
near failure. 
The exercise of judgement in engineering practice requires an 
adequate theoretical basis, validated by experiments and 
observations. The role of theory in ‘engineering practice’ is 
well established, and its importance has long been recognised 
in dam engineering. Professor Terzaghi, a ‘practical’ engineer 
‘par excellence’ was acutely aware of the need for adequate 
theories and their role in practice. The advice provided by 
Terzaghi concerning the role of theory in geotechnical 
engineering practice and the role of rigorous and simplified 
solutions is also applicable to the exercise of judgement in 
estimating failure probabilities of dams. 
According to Tet-zaghi, “the ability to obtain rigorous 
solutions is not a prerequisite for success@ work in the field 
of soil mechanics. For both the research man and the 
practising engineer it is sufficient to know the general 
procedure by means of which the rigorous solutions are 
obtained. The rigorous solution of the problems should be left 
to professional mathematicians. ” However, Terzaghi made it 
perfectly clear that practice is based on theory and that 
adequate theories are a necessary part of practical engineering 
and the exercise of judgement in engineering practice. 
Immediate observations include: 
Estimating risks posed by dams requires adequate 
analytical theories to provide a basis for developing 
practical approaches to analysing risks, 
The empirical record of dam failures and incidents can 
not in itself provide an adequate basis for inferences 
concerning failure risks in individual cases. 
If ‘judgmental probabilities’ were to be genuinely 
characterised as ‘judgements’, in the established 
engineering sense as opposed to quantified statements of 
opinion, they would be based on analytically derived 
predictions. In other words, the apparent differences 
between the ‘analytical probability ’ philosophy and the 
‘judgmental probability’ philosophy cease to exist if 
proponents of the yudgmental probabili@’ philosophy 
adopt the established approach to exercising judgement in 
engineering practice. 
In the absence of adequate theories of dam failure mechanisms 
on which to base judgements of probability, and given the 
philosophical problems associated with mixing objective and 
subjective probabilities, the ‘empirical/judgmental’ approach 
to estimating probabilities of dam failure becomes an 
intellectual and philosophical failure. Thus, while it was clear 
that it might always be possible to make a subjective estimate 
of dam failure probability, this subjective estimate is no more 
a property of the dam than the betting odds on a horse are a 
property of the horse! 
Owner’s might find these ‘simplified de-compositional 
degree-of-belief of benefit in an overall decision-making 
process provided that they do not consider the risk numbers as 
having any objective meaning. Subjective estimates of dam 
failure probability cannot be compared with objective criteria. 
SIMPLIFIED DE-COMPOSITIONAL APPROACHES 
As described in Part I, BC Hydro embarked on an extensive 
investigation into the use of the ‘de-compositional’ event tree 
approach in the early 1990’s in the interests of having 
sufficient experience in applying the method to a wide range 
of situations encountered in dam safety practice. In 1993, BC 
Hydro published its risk-based dam safety guidelines in 
interim form. Importantly, the procedures section was not 
developed but an illustrative example application of the 
simplified de-compositional process to BC Hydro’s Alouette 
Dam was presented. 
Initially, it appeared that the approach was feasible and the 
results of the studies were presented at various dam safety 
conferences to promote discussion. Oddly, apart from isolated 
situations, the expected barrage of objections did not 
materialise - had we succeeded? or, were we being ignored? 
Recognising well founded concerns from within BC Hydro 
and mindful that there were few opportunities for review and 
critique by knowledgeable peers, and in response to serious 
difficulties that were encountered during individual studies, 
BC Hydro embarked on its own critique of its work. 
The most significant concerns from within the project team 
responsible for the developmental work were that the 
estimates of dam failure probability were artefacts of the event 
tree model and the subjective ‘degree-of-belief of the analysis 
team. It was all achieved in the absence of robust theories and 
analytical models, experimental evidence and empirical 
experience. In fact, the simplified de-compositional approach 
suffers from essentially the same drawbacks as the simplified 
‘judgmental’ approach although it is less open to ridicule. The 
interpretation of the theory of subjective probability and the 
Kent Charts used to transform degrees of belief to numerical 
statements of probability do not overcome the difftculties in 
performing a de-compositional analysis. Anything short of 
total de-composition of the failure mechanism into its 
fundamental components means that the estimate of risk is an 
artefact of the event tree model and the mind of the analyst. 
By 1995, BC Hydro had abandoned the ‘Kent Chart’ approach 
to assigning ‘degree-of-belief probabilities. 
This does not mean that these studies were of no value, as they 
have potential to assist in planning further investigations and 
in the prioritisation of dam safety improvements. The studies 
in question relate to the dams listed in Table 114. However, 
they fell short of the objective of risk assessment; that is, 
determining ifthe dam is safe enough. 
I have taken the step of presenting this list in this way to 
provide a clear warning against the application of the 
procedures outlined in these ‘experiments’ in dam safety 
practice. This said, these ‘experiments’ were immensely 
valuable in revealing the difficulties of performing 
quantitative risk analysis for different types of dams for a wide 
range of failure modes. 
Table II- 4. BC Hydro dams where the simplified de- 
compositional seismic risk analysis was not adequate for 
formal risk assessment. 
The outcome of this unprecedented investigation program was 
that, while certain, but by no means all, failure modes 
associated with extreme floods and earthquakes were 
amenable in principle to quantification, static failure modes, 
such as internal erosion, are not. This does not mean that it is 
not possible to make subjective estimates of probabilities of 
failure for all possible failure modes, , if only a quantified 
statement of opinion is adequate. However, such quantified 
statements of opinion are no more than a number that resides 
in the head of the estimator, which, if not generated through 
valid procedures, are nothing more than ‘guesses’. 
The failure of these ‘experimental’ studies to produce the 
desired result was actually a benefit in disguise as the 
experience gained led to the development of BC Hydro’s risk- 
based dam safety prioritisation system (Hartford and Stewart, 
1998) Further, and very importantly it led to a complete 
review of BC Hydro’s dam safety management philosophy. 
The result was that BC Hydro has moved beyond the simple 
concept of estimating dam risks and comparing them with 
numerical criteria (expected value, f-N and F-N curves etc.) to 
determine if a dam is safe enough. We subsequently found 
that our re-aligned philosophy as entirely consistent with the 
position of the UK Health and Safety Executive, which is 
arguably one of the most experienced and advanced ‘risk 
regulators’ in the world. 
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THE ROLE OF SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY 
None of the above should be interpreted as implying that the 
theory of subjective probability does not have a place in risk 
analysis for dam safety; it does. In fact, the formal theory of 
subjective theory as applied through the careful use of Bayes’ 
Theorem is central to the success of risk analysis in dam safety 
practice. However, in the vast majority of examples cited in 
the literature, Bayes’ Theorem is remarkably absent. 
Application of Bayes’ Theorem is essential for the subjective 
probability to be credible and defensible, as Bayes’ Theorem 
provides the necessary mathematical structure to ensure 
robustness. However, one view in dam safety holds that the 
formal application of Bayes’ Theorem should not be conJitsed 
with the “‘Bayesian” probability approach, as degree-of belief 
interpretations are sometimes called. This terminology results 
from the idea embodied in Bayes’ Theorem that probability 
varies according to the information available, but does not 
necessarily impIy formal application of the theorem itself 
(Vi& 1999). The validity of this view has yet to be broadly 
accepted and appears to be contrary to the view expressed by 
experts in the field of Bayesian probability (Cooke, 1991.) 
Morgan and Henrion, 1990., Pat&Cornell, 1996, Kaplan, 
1997). Resolution of this issue rests with experts in 
probability and scientific inference, with appropriate 
involvement of knowledgeable engineers to ensure that the 
practical considerations are not lost in esoteric theory. 
However, until it is resolved, owners must recognise that it is 
an important issue that requires resolution and must take 
whatever steps are necessary to avoid any difficulties 
associated with it. Until the former view is ‘validated’ by the 
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wider mathematical and scientific communities, and to 
proceed in a defensible manner, applications of ‘subjective’ 
probability should be carried out within the formal 
mathematical framework of Bayesian probability. 
SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY AND TRANSPARENCY 
There are increasing demands for risk assessment to be 
scientifically based. Miss J. Bacon, the Director General of 
the UK Health and Safety Executive gave what I believe to be 
sound advice, the task of the risk regulator - and of the 
scientiJic and engineering communities - is to reassert the 
concepts ofjustified risk and of ‘safe enough ‘; to demonstrate 
the effectiveness of good science and technology in providing 
robust systems of risk management and control; and to make 
transparent the process undertaken for arriving at scientific 
judgements and engineering decisions. 
In the same paper, Miss Bacon noted “20 years ago an 
eminent engineer in the UK suggested that: Engineering is 
the art of moulding materials that we do not wholly 
understand into shapes we cannot precisely analyse, so as to 
withstand forces we cannot really assess, in such a way that 
the community at large has no reason to suspect the extent of 
our ignorance. ” This was accompanied by a clear warning by 
this risk regulator: ‘I [J. Bacon] am afraid that 20 years on, 
such black box mysticism in dealing with sources of risk is no 
longer viable. The credibity of risk prevention and control is 
at stake. ” 
Fig. II-4 Event Tree Analysis using specialist opinion method of probability estimation 
Here it is vitally important not to confuse ‘scientific validity’ 
(application of the scientific method) with ‘scientific proof as 
they are distinctly different concepts. Many real life decisions 
must be addressed before the scientific community can reach a 
consensus, and this applies to dam safety decisions which are 
fraught with uncertainty. What it does mean is that even 
under conditions of great uncertainty, the principles of 
scientific inference can be applied. 
The following basic principles, which were formulated as part 
of a research project into models for expert opinion elicitation 
carried out under the auspices of the Dutch Government 
(Cooke, 1991.) are also of value in risk analysis for dam 
safety. These principles are: 
Reproducibility: It must be possible for scientiJic peers to 
review and if necessary reproduce all calculations. This 
entails that the calculation models must be filly specljied and 
the ingredient data must be made available. 
Accountability: The source of the expert subjective 
probabilities must be identified (this is particularly true for 
decision-making concerning the safety of the public). 
Empirical Control: Expert probability estimates must in 
principle be susceptible to empirical control. 
Neutrality: The method for combining expert opinion should 
encourage experts to state their true opinions. 
Fairness: All experts are treated equally. prior to processing 
the results of observations. 
One challenge faced by proponents of risk assessment for 
dams is to demonstrate how these perfectly reasonable 
principles are applied in their practices. In my view, and from 
an analytical perspective, these principles are particularly 
important as they relate to the fundamental process of 
estimating probabilities and probable states. Scientific 
theories can never be conclusively verified, but, if a theory is 
in fact false, then in principle it should be possible to conduct 
a reproducible experiment to demonstrate that this is the case. 
This process is fundamental to empirical control - it is the 
safeguard against the argument that everybody’s subjective 
probabilities are equally valid. The use of subjective 
probability does not permit the ‘expert’ to say whatever he/she 
wants, and adherence to these principles ensures that the 
analysis cannot be corrupted by institutional pressures and/or 
motivational biases. 
Consequently, there is a clear need for studies to demonstrate 
that there is detailed analysis behind the numbers in event 
trees. For example as in figure II-4 (Von Thun, 1996). 
This does not mean that the numbers in this example are not 
based on detailed engineering analysis; rather there is a need 
to demonstrate that they are. ‘Rolling back’ a long complex 
event tree to illustrate results in a simple easily understandable 
form is a straightforward matter, as illustrated for Keenleyside 
Dam. 
Intermediate “Collapsed” Probabilities 
For example one of the useful 
intenediate values is the 
Probabilitv of Rapid OvertoDDina 
given the-N valu;. the w&r’ - 
level. PGA and magnitude. First step is to collapse these level 
Collapsing (Rolling Back) the Probabilities of Levels 7 and 8 
These are the condWxxl 
probabllitles 
cotrespondlng to different 
maps. 
different ST’S, and. 
dlfferent KS. 
\ 
No. of rows = 5 (maps) x 5 (w’s) x 3 (y’s) 
Continue to collapse the Probabilities to Levels 6 & 5 
. 
The result of rolling back level 7 and 6 probabilities is the 
CondItional Probabilities of Damage States given the specific 
combination of the (map, s r , y lim} 
For each map, there are 15 combinations (5 selected values of sr 
and 3 selected values of y lim) - that is there are 15 rows for each 
map and each row is associated with a specific combination of sr 
and y I~,.,, values. 
Rolling back the probabilities for level 5 and 6 and for each map is 
equivalent to finding the weighted sum of 15 rows. The weights 
are the product of the probabilities of sr and y lim values. 
Probability of Damage States for a Given Liq. Map 
Continue to Collapse the Probabilities to Level 4 
- There are only 5 distinct maps with multiple damage states and 
pmbabilitias. The damage state for map 6 is assigned 100 % ‘no damage’. 
Each of these maps was assigned to the en&node of level 4 branches. 
- Roll bade to level 4 probabilities can be achieved. again, by finding the 
weighted sum of the probatilities of damage given tha liquefaction map. 
Probability of Damage States for a Given (Act., Msg.) Combination 
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Collapsed Probabilities at Level 3 - 1 Damage State 





. (N,&,= 10 
- Water Level = 440 m 
l PGA. and, 
- Magnitude 
Magnitude 
Continue to Collapse the Probabilities to Levels 2 & 1 
Level 2 - Magnitude Contributions summed(welghted). 
Accelralloll 
NO Minor SlgnM Major Delayed Repid 
PGA CondftIwl ~a- Dvrugs OVW- over- 
(9) Probwlty 
Dazmw D-w topPIng topPIng 
50 6.696X 1P 0.450 0.063 0.066 0.053 0.054 0.330 . . ..‘................................................................................... 
.___ ,4? ___ 5.216x1.e. o.MJI 0.047 0.027 0.029 0.031 . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..%?+.. 
34 7.6241. lp 0.679 ._..~..............__............. 0.051 0.044 ______~_~~~~~~~~~~ 0.037 0.034 .OJ.?. 
26 1.641 x 1U5 0.755 0.035 0.021 0.022 0.023 0.160 
.l’? ___. 5.576 x 1U!...'?:9!7.. 0.022 0.006 0.007 . . . . . . _____....._......... 
.lO 6.690 x l(r 0.962 0.014 0.012 
___________ . ..!.oor, ..__ !????.. 
0.008 0.006 
Level 1 - Summed (weighted) over acceleration intervals. 
Middh c.OSS !%dW ,,c YInor wwm- Delayed Rapid 
(N,b = 10 Dlmags Damage cant 
Major 
watsrLevel=44o.om Damage Da- 
OVM- Over- 
topping toppIng 
Weighted Sum ,.*,ox,O’l253r,0 9.881.10 Bss1r,0’5s5sxlo~r.4a3rlo 
Therefore, the numbers in the simplified event tree in Fig. II-4 
should be supported by analysis of the type illustrated for 
Keenleyside Dam, and the proposed procedure of Lin and 
Hung. This should not be misinterpreted as opposition to 
practical approaches, rather as reminding ourselves of the 
process which ultimately leads to practical engineering 
solutions to complex problems. The philosophy is quite 
simple and reflects the basic principles of engineering 
practice: 
1. Develop a clear understanding of the problem, 
recoguising that real world problems are generally too 
complex to be amenable to precise description or exact 
solution. 
2. Radically idealise the problem to make it amenable to 
analysis by modelling the essential features and de- 
emphasising the less essential (this requires skill at 
modelling situations that are often beyond anyone’s 
experience). 
3. Develop a rigorous theoretical solution to the radically 
simplified model of reality. 
4. Make further approximations to the model and the 
solution to create the ‘practical solution’, which can be 
applied in practice, recognising that the rigorous 
theoretical solution to the idealisation of the real problem 
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is necessary to ‘calibrate’ the approximate ‘practical’ 
solution 
Unfortunately, for commercial and other reasons, including 
shifts in funding of learned endeavours, this established four- 
step process has, for the most part not been carried out in the 
evolution of risk analysis in dam safety practice. Rather, the 
‘empirical/judgmental’ approach has been put forward as the 
‘practical’ approach, even though they are generally devoid of 
the necessary theories and mathematical solutions. 
Regrettably, the ‘empirical/judgmental’ approach to risk 
estimation is now being staunchly defended, in the same way 
as clinical experience, which is also devoid of necessary 
theories and validated experimental results, is defended by 
clinicians. 
Meeting requirements for scientific validity and transparency 
should not pose any difficulties in principle as the concept of 
dams being designed in terms of scientific principles was 
introduced over one hundred and thirty years ago. However, it 
might present enormous difftculties in practice at this time. 
Importantly, meeting requirements for scientific validity and 
transparency strengthens the role of judgement in risk-based 
dam safety decision making as it dispels any notions of ‘black- 
box mysticism’ or ‘junk science’. 
Most importantly, scientific validity and transparency provides 
owners, regulators and the public with a basis for having 
confidence in dam safety decisions based on the results of a 
risk analysis, something that does not exist at present. Here, I 
am putting forward the view that scientific validity and 
transparency of analytical procedures is essential for the 
acceptance of risk analysis as a legitimate means of informing 
the dam safety decision-making process. 
CONCLUSIONS 
That risk analysis in dam safety practice is controversial 
should not come as a surprise as it involves the mathematics of 
probability. Unfortunately, the modem literature on risk 
analysis for dams is decidedly unhelpful in dealing with this 
controversy as two opposite views, together with all possible 
views in between these two extremes, are frequently 
presented. At one extreme, there is the view that 
“methodologies for estimating the chance of dam failure are 
poorly developed and, at the present time, do not provide a 
defensible basis for the conclusive sign off on the safety status 
of a dam”. At the other extreme, there is the view that 
“methods are available for estimating the probability of failure 
of dams for use in quantitative risk assessment for all failure 
modes”. Such are the differences of opinion between 
proponents of risk assessment for dams in the same country! 
The controversy is not restricted to the probabilistic 
component of the analysis, as dam failure mechanisms are not 
well understood and generally difficult to model. 
Regrettably, the modem literature on quantitative risk 
assessment for dams is increasingly suspect as there is clear 
evidence that it is being contaminated by re-cycled ideas, 
many which have been previously ‘debunked’ and others that 
can be classed as ‘recycled and wrong’. This introduces a new 
problem which owners need to be aware of if they rely on the 
literature and/or those who write on the subject. There is a 
clear need to improve the quality of the literature and to raise 
the level of debate concerning risk analysis of dams and to 
continually improve professional practice to ensure that 
Professor De Mello’s concern (De Mello, 2000) about pseudo- 
professional analysing of risks (Professor De Mello is not 
alone in holding this view) is consigned to the history books. 
If these vitally important issues are not addressed, scepticism 
and lack of confidence in risk analysis in dam safety practice 
will become even more entrenched. 
Judgement has a vitally important role in the risk analysis 
process. However, greater openness and clarity about how 
judgements are exercised is increasingly being expected by 
those affected by decisions, in return for their trust and 
confidence. A great deal of work still needs to be done to 
explain how judgements in analysing risks posed by dams are 
exercised. It is no longer acceptable to present risk estimates 
and associated decisions as ‘matters of judgement’ without 
further explanation, still less to cloud them in the pretence of 
being matters of fact. Increasingly, there is a requirement to 
demonstrate that the exercise of judgement complies with 
defined procedures to ensure robustness and tractability. This 
will not be easy and will challenge jealously guarded 
professionalism. This challenge applies to proponents of 
deterministic approaches to dam safety as well as proponents 
of the risk analysis approach. Specifically, it applies to those 
who favour the empiricaVjudgmenta1 and/or the ‘degree-of- 
belief approach to estimating probabilities of dam failures. 
I hope that the reasons why I have concluded that judgement 
should be based on the knowledge that is revealed by an 
appropriate amount of analysis are understood because, 
unfortunately, they are often misinterpreted. I remain 
confident that provided we work in terms of accepted 
scientific principles, it will be possible to establish the 
scientific basis for risk assessment in dam safety. Of course 
this does not mean that we have to ‘prove everything 
scientifically’ along the way; real life decisions usually can’t 
wait for the scientists to ‘figure it all out’ and come to a 
‘consensus’. Rather we must employ the established 
principles of the ‘scientific method’ and ensure that our 
‘estimation procedures’ don’t violate any of the laws of 
physics, or the principles of probability theory and scientific 
inference. 
Failure to meet the expectations of scientific validity and 
transparency in an increasingly sophisticated society could 
well mean that we will not, i) overcome the growing mistrust 
by the public of advice given by scientists and risk calculators, 
and ii) earn the trust of the engineering and scientific 
communities, regulators and, most importantly, the public 
whose consent to own and operate dams is one of our most 
valuable assets. 
Presently, from an owner’s perspective, and in the light of my 
background research as summarised in this lecture, I have no 
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option but to conclude that, for the most part, “methodologies 
for estimating the chance of dam failure are poorly developed 
and, at the present time, do not provide a defensible basis for 
the conclusive sign off on the safety status of a dam. In fact I 
go further and advise that at present, and for the purpose of 
legally defensible quantitative risk assessment, risks posed by 
dams can only be estimated in a scientifically valid way for a 
small number of failure modes, and only where the failure 
initiating event can be characterised probabilistically in a 
mathematically correct way. 
This said, I have also concluded that the future for quantitative 
risk analysis and its use in dam risk management is decidedly 
bright, provided the appropriate resources are brought to bear 
on the problem of analysing dam risks. There are solid reasons 
to believe that risk analysis procedures for other modes of dam 
failure can be achieved if research and development efforts are 
carefully chosen, planned and implemented. It should not 
come as a surprise that a great deal of research and 
development into failure modes, mechanisms and their 
probabilistic description, is required. However, there is no 
option other than to address these challenges as uncertainty 
pervades all aspects of dam engineering. The Keenleyside 
Dam risk analysis is an example of what can be done and 
demonstrates at least in principle that scientifically valid and 
defensible risk analysis for dams can now be achieved under 
certain circumstances. Great strides have been made in the 
understanding of the fundamentals of risk analysis for dams 
during the past thirty- five years, and especially during the 
past three years. 1997 was a ‘watershed’ year in risk analysis 
in dam safety. 
This State-of-the-Art and Practice lecture has provided me 
with the opportunity to set out a strategy for achieving 
scientifically valid, legally defensible estimates of risks posed 
by dams. I hope that the Canadian Electricity Association 
(CEA) Dam Safety Interest Group project A Guide to Dam 
Risk Management provides an organisational structure to 
achieve this end. I have concluded that, provided we move 
beyond the proposed practices of the 80’s and 90’s and 
embrace the ideas of scientifically-based risk analysis in dam 
safety, the future looks very bright indeed. I look forward to 
being joined by others committed to managing dam risks on 
the basis of scientifically valid and legally defensible risk 
analyses, and to working with them to achieve this objective. 
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